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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Fire Insurance Exchange has appealed an Order entered by 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on March 25, 1992 denying Fire 
Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did Judge Frederick abuse his discretion in denying Fire 
Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur? This Court reverses 
the trial court only if there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 
(Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal involves the propriety of the punitive damage 
award entered against Fire Insurance as a result of the intentional 
fraud it perpetrated on the Crookstons. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
This is the second appeal taken by Fire Insurance in this 
case. In the first appeal, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), this Court affirmed the jury's finding 
that Fire Insurance had committed fraud, upheld the compensatory 
award and determined that Fire Insurance had acted with the 
requisite mental state to justify an award of punitive damages. 
However, the Court vacated the trial court's denial of Fire 
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Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur pertaining to the $4 
million punitive award and remanded the motion to the trial court 
for further review. 
On remand, the parties briefed the motion in light of the 
Crookston opinion, and Judge Frederick heard oral argument on 
January 31, 1992. After having reviewed the parties' memoranda, the 
Crookston opinion, the file materials, the transcript and his own 
notes, Judge Frederick issued a Memorandum Decision on February 10, 
1992 again denying Fire Insurance's motion. (Copy attached as 
Exhibit A.) Judge Frederick subsequently entered his formal order 
on March 25, 1992. (Copy attached as Exhibit B.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This case involves the failure of Fire Insurance Exchange, 
a member of the Farmers Insurance Group, to timely and properly 
adjust and settle a casualty loss to the Crookstons' home. Through 
a series of misrepresentations and concealments, Fire Insurance 
perpetrated a fraud on the Crookstons and on Rocky Mountain State 
Bank ("the Bank") , holder of a first deed of trust on the 
Crookstons' home and loss payee under the Fire Insurance policy. By 
means of a fraudulent and inadequate settlement with the Bank, Fire 
Insurance obtained a release and satisfaction of the Bank's claim on 
the policy. The Bank then proceeded to foreclosure. As a result, 
the Crookstons lost their home and were forced into bankruptcy. The 
Crookstons filed suit against Fire Insurance, resulting in a 
judgment in June, 1987. 
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It has now been over a year since the first appeal was 
completed. Memories fade over time. Since the issues on appeal are 
fact intensive, it is important to review the facts in detail. 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were married in 1973. Mr. 
Crookston continually worked two to three jobs and saved for many 
years until 1978, when the Crookstons paid cash for a vacant lot in 
Bountiful, Utah. (R. 2000-1) They continued to work and save their 
money in anticipation of building their home on the unencumbered 
lot. 
2. In December 1980, the Crookstons obtained a con-
struction loan from the Bank in the amount of $60,000 and in the 
early part of 1981, began construction. (R. 2006) During the course 
of construction, the Crookstons personally paid approximately $5,000 
toward construction costs and paid the Bank $12,000 to reduce the 
construction loan. (R. 2009; Ex's. 2, 5) The Crookstons also 
performed various services such as painting and finish work in order 
to keep costs down. (R. 2019-20, 2160) On December 2, 1981, the 
roof of the Crookstons' home collapsed, causing extensive damage. 
3. Kyle Brewster, the contractor who was building the 
Crookstons' home, had approximately 40 years of contracting and 
estimating experience. (R. 2150) He testified that just prior to 
the time of the collapse, the home was approximately two-thirds 
completed and had the collapse not occurred, the home could have 
been completed within budget during the next four to five weeks. (R. 
2159-60, 2181) Besides the structure, scaffolding, other e- lipment 
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and unused building materials were also destroyed in the collapse. 
(R. 2161-62, 2114) 
4. The Crookstons gave prompt notice to their insurer, 
Fire Insurance, who assigned Denton Moser to investigate and adjust 
the loss. Other than taking pictures, Moser did very little to 
determine the scope of the damage and evaluate the loss. (Ex. 11, 
12) Fire Insurance did not contest coverage and admitted that the 
cause of the collapse was irrelevant to the Crookstons' claim. (R. 
1889-90, 2236) In mid-December, 1981, Fire Insurance retained Kent 
Rich, an engineer, to determine the cause of the collapse for 
purposes of protecting and enabling Fire Insurance to pursue a 
subrogation claim. Fire Insurance did not request Mr. Rich to 
ascertain the scope of the damage or evaluate the loss for adjusting 
purposes. (R. 2655-57, 1926; Ex. 41, p. 3-4) 
5. Within a few weeks after the collapse, the Crookstons 
retained attorney Ralph Klemm because they were concerned that Fire 
Insurance was not doing anything to adjust the loss. In their first 
communication, Moser asked Klemm to assist him in obtaining a bid to 
have the home repaired. (R. 1686-87) Mr. Klemm obtained an esti-
mate from Rex Stallings, an experienced contractor of 36 years. (R. 
2097) The Crookstons and Moser also sought an estimate from 
Brewster. (R. 2403-4) 
6. By the end of March, 1982, Moser had the bids of two 
contractors: (1) Brewster in the amount of $50,951, and (2) Rex 
Stallings in the amount of $49,600. (Ex. 38, p. 2; Ex. 40; R. 1693-
94) Based upon these bids, Moser submitted an internal request for 
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$50,000 settlement authority to the Pocatello regional office. (R. 
1977). On April 15, the regional office extended settlement 
authority in the amount of $49,443.00. (Ex. 13, p.2) In May, Moser 
obtained a bid from Jimmy Jones, an architect, in the amount of 
$74,000 (Ex. 11, p. 101), but ignored it without inquiry. (Ex. 11, 
p.101; R. 1992) 
7. Rather than offering anything to settle the claim, 
Fire Insurance requested Rich, the engineer, to perform an analysis 
of the observable structural damage. (R. 2654-56, 2663) On May 25, 
Rich prepared a report outlining some of the structural damage that 
had to be addressed. (Ex. 41, p.l) Fire Insurance never requested 
Mr. Rich to evaluate all of the damage, nor did it ever inform Rich 
that his report would be the basis for a bid to reconstruct the 
house. (R. 2656) Rich testified that, "The approach that I took in 
making that investigation was not such that my report could be used 
as a bid list for bidding the repair of or of repairing the total 
structure." (R. 2654) He then described how the sheetrock covered 
most of the walls and there was no way to determine the extent of 
the damages to the studs, joists, and the plumbing, electrical and 
heating systems. (R. 2659, 2661-62) 
8. During May, 1982, Fire Insurance replaced Moser with 
a more experienced adjuster, Alan Clapperton. Even though Clapper-
ton had no basis to doubt the validity of the prior three bids (R. 
2242-43), he totally disregarded them without notice to or discus-
sion with the Crookstons, their attorney, or the Bank. (R. 1694, 
1699, 2015-16) 
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9. Knowing that Mr. Rich's report was limited in scope, 
Clapperton took the report to Steven Phipps, a licensed contractor 
of only three years, (R. 2592) Moser, the previous adjuster, had 
contacted Phipps in February about possibly preparing a bid but did 
not pursue it due to Phipps' lack of experience. (R. 1993, 2584) 
When Clapperton contacted Phipps, Clapperton gave Phipps the Rich 
report, represented that the report covered all of the damage, and 
asked Phipps to prepare a bid based thereon. (R. 2246) Phipps knew 
from prior experience that if he was required to rebuild the 
Crookston home, he could submit supplemental bids and be paid for 
additional work and materials not described in his original bid. (R. 
2610-11) Phipps then prepared a bid in the amount of $27,830.60 and 
delivered it to Clapperton on June 14, 1982. (Ex. 11, pp. 109-115; 
R. 2247) Knowing that his bid would not cover all repairs, Phipps 
expressly qualified his bid, stating "This bid is to do only the 
items listed here and outlined by the engineer Kent Rich." (Ex. 11, 
p. 114) Phipps did not believe he would be asked to actually 
rebuild the home but nonetheless qualified his bid to ensure that if 
he were ever requested to rebuild he could supplement his bid for 
additional items. (R. 2605, 2621) 
10. Mr. Phipps is the son-in-law of a Farmers Insurance 
agent and was doing a substantial amount of insurance repair work 
for Fire Insurance through his father-in-law's referrals. (R. 2618-
19, 2593-94) Phipps7 credibility was seriously questioned, not only 
because of his bias, but because his bid was wholly inadequate and 
disproportionate to the other bids. Phipps admitted at trial that 
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his bid omitted numerous items that should have been included, such 
as the broken cement driveway (R. 2114, 2632-33), the cost of engi-
neer services (R. 2626); numerous building supplies and material 
that were destroyed (R. 2634); a large crack in a foundation wall 
(Ex. 42, pp. 26-29, R. 2633); the damage to electrical, plumbing and 
heating systems (R. 2634-42); sandblasting the interior wall (R. 
2634-36); paint, stain and labor relating thereto (R. 2637); water-
proofing the outer shell (R. 2638-40); additional interest on the 
construction loan during the rebuilding phase (R. 2644) ; and 
numerous other items (R. 2642-43). Phipps admitted on cross-
examination that his bid was incomplete and that any representation 
that his bid would be sufficient to rebuild the home would be 
untrue. (R. 2646-48, 2651-53) 
11. The Phipps bid was based upon salvaging and reusing 
most of the interior walls and floors, even though he did not know 
whether they could be salvaged. (R. 2627-29) It was clear from the 
evidence that such salvage was impossible. A disinterested witness, 
Argen Jager, a contractor of 50 years experience who bought the 
collapsed house from the Bank (R. 2665-66), testified that when he 
rebuilt the house, he had to completely tear out the interior due to 
the extensive damage and was able to salvage very little of the 
original building materials. (R. 2666-67) 
12. Clapperton received the qualified Phipps bid on June 
14, 1982. (R. 2247) Knowing that the bid was inadequate and did 
not include all of the amounts owing under the policy (R. 2248-52, 
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2320-21; Ex. 11, p. 114), he immediately called the Bank to arrange 
a settlement meeting on June 16. (R. 2253-54, 2035) 
13. Since March, 1982., Mr. Klemm and the Bank had tele-
phoned Fire Insurance on a regular basis inquiring about settlement. 
Fire Insurance continually told them that the adjusters were working 
on a settlement, and that they would shortly get back to them with 
an offer. (R. 1697-1700, 2033-34) The Bank had even tried to find 
a contractor to bid the repairs, but was unsuccessful. (R. 2035) 
As early as April, Mr. Klemm had made a demand for $50,000. (R. 
1695-96) Clapperton therefore knew that Mr. Klemm would resist any 
settlement based upon the Phipps bid. 
14. On June 16, 1982, Mr. Klemm contacted Clapperton, 
expressing concern over the delay and again requesting the status of 
the settlement. (R. 1700-1) Clapperton told Mr. Klemm that he was 
working on the settlement, that he needed a little more time and 
that he would shortly be getting back to him with a settlement 
proposal. (R. 1700-1) Clapperton said nothing about the Phipps bid 
or the settlement meeting scheduled with the Bank later that day. 
15. Soon after the conversation with Mr. Klemm, Clapper-
ton drove from his Ogden office to Salt Lake City for the purpose of 
meeting with the Bank. (R. 2255) In this meeting, Clapperton 
knowingly misrepresented that he had obtained a complete engineering 
report on the damages and had obtained a detailed bid that included 
everything necessary to completely rebuild the Crookstons' home. 
(R. 2038, 2257) He intentionally concealed the existence of any 
other bids. (R. 2039) Clapperton misrepresented that nothing more 
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was owing under the policy than the amount reflected on the Phipps 
bid. (R. 2038) Clapperton then pressed to settle the matter 
immediately for $27,830.60. (R. 2037) The Bank raised the issue of 
$5,014.00 in interest (accruing at approximately 20% per annum, R. 
2045) which had accrued on the Crookstons' loan since the collapse. 
(R. 2038-39) Instead of disclosing that the interest would be 
covered under the additional living expense coverage, Clapperton 
represented that as a demonstration of Fire Insurance's good faith, 
he would be willing to pay the interest if the Bank would settle 
immediately. (Ex. 12, p. 2) 
16. Clapperton insisted that the settlement check be 
issued directly to the Bank without including the Crookstons' name. 
(R. 2037) Mr. Murdock, the Bank officer, had had only one or two 
experiences involving loss payee coverage. (R. 2032) Being 
concerned, he telephoned the Bank's attorney Brent Ward, who advised 
that he could proceed with the settlement. (R. 2037-38) Clapperton 
then insisted that the Bank execute a proof of loss form which 
contained the following language, "The said company in consideration 
of such payment to or for the named insured is hereby discharged 
forever from all further claims by reason of said loss or damage." 
(Ex. 11, p. 117; R. 2040) The reverse side of the settlement check 
given to the Bank also contained a total release of the Bank's 
claims for insurance. (Ex. 16) 
17. Mr. Murdock testified on behalf of the Bank that had 
he known about the other bids, he would not have settled for the 
$27,830.60, plus interest, because the large discrepancy between the 
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bids would have called into question the validity of the Phipps bid, 
(R. 2039-40) Clapperton admitted that at the time he met with the 
Bank, he knew: (1) the Bank was relying upon the Phipps bid when it 
agreed to settle; (2) that the outstanding balance on the loan was 
close to $60,000.00; (3) that the settlement amount was insufficient 
to prevent the Bank from foreclosing; (4) that the Bank would seek 
any deficiency from the Crookstons and foreclose on the Crookstons' 
property; and (5) that experiencing foreclosure would be very 
traumatic to the Crookstons. (R. 1931, 2238-39f 2261, 2265; Ex. 11, 
pp. 84, 86) 
18. Clapperton made no effort to advise Mr. Klemm of the 
settlement. Instead, Mr. Klemm discovered the settlement when he 
later contacted the Bank. (R. 1701-2) Mr. Klemm immediately called 
Clapperton who emphatically stated (1) that Fire Insurance had fully 
settled all claims under the policy, (2) that the insureds did not 
have to be included in the settlement, (3) that nothing more was 
owing, and (4) that he was closing his file. (R. 1703) Clapperton 
then closed his claims file by submitting it to his regional office 
in Pocatello (R. 2282-83; Ex. 12, p. 1). He made no further efforts 
to communicate with the Crookstons or address their claims. (R. 
2279) After the settlement, Clapperton knew the Crookstons would 
lose their property to the Bank. (Ex. 15, p. 3) 
19. After the settlement, the Bank advised Mr. Klemm that 
it would not rebuild the Crookston home and would commence fore-
closure proceedings unless the Crookstons paid the balance of 
approximately $23,000.00 owing on the construction loan. (R. 1706) 
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The Crookstons had depleted their savings and were without means to 
pay the Bank. (R. 1711) The Crookstons were also being sued by 
subcontractors who were foreclosing on mechanics' liens filed 
against the Crookstons' property. Fire Insurance was aware of these 
liens. (R. 1710, 2584; Ex. 26) After deliberation, Mr. Klemm 
recommended bankruptcy and referred the Crookstons to a bankruptcy 
attorney, Phil Harding, who also recommended bankruptcy. (R. 1709, 
1790, 1805, 1815, 1817, 1858-60) The Crookstons were opposed to 
bankruptcy (R. 1816-17, 2412, 2119), but felt they had no choice and 
filed under Chapter 7 on July 1, 1982. (Ex. 6) The bankruptcy case 
remained open pending the outcome of this case. (R. 1864) To avoid 
additional interest, attorney's fees and costs, the Crookstons 
consented to a deed of their property to the Bank in lieu of the 
threatened foreclosure. (R. 1713-14; Ex. 30, p.222) 
20. There was overwhelming evidence that Clapperton was 
dishonest, not only in his actions at the time of his fraudulent 
scheme with the Bank, but also in his testimony at trial. His 
testimony was inconsistent with most other witnesses and documents. 
For example, at trial, he denied that his meeting with the Bank was 
for the purpose of settlement and claimed that the Bank forced him 
into settling. (R. 2255-56) Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's super-
visor, testified, however, that Clapperton told him that he was 
leaving the office to settle with the Bank. (R. 1932-33) Clapperton 
represented the Phipps bid ($27,830.60) as legitimate and the only 
amount owing under the policy even though he knew Fire Insurance's 
reserve (estimate of loss for internal accounting purposes) was set 
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at $60,000. (R. 1912, 1914, 2269-70; Ex. 14) Clapperton's trial 
testimony even differed radically from his deposition testimony on 
material issues. (R. 2269-76, 2280-85) When his inconsistent 
testimony was pointed out to the jury, Clapperton became extremely 
nervous and clearly appeared as if he were lying, so much so that 
his attorney in closing statements tried to explain away his 
nervousness. (R. 2714-15) 
21. Milton Beck, an insurance adjuster with 22 years of 
experience, and Dr. Paul Randle, a professor of finance who teaches 
property and casualty insurance at Utah State University, described 
the actions of Fire Insurance as "blatantly outrageous" and "totally 
unacceptable" (R. 2334, 2510), outlining the following wrongful 
actions: 
a. Excluding the Crookstons from the 
settlement negotiations. (R. 2313-14) 
b. Relying on a bid which was almost 
one-half of other bids. Such a discrepancy 
would mean there was something wrong with the 
low bid. (R. 2314, 2318-19) 
c. Failing to disclose all other bids to 
the Bank. (R. 2314-15) 
d. Improperly requiring the Bank to sign 
a satisfaction of claim and release without 
rebuilding the home. (R. 2316-17) 
e. Requiring the Bank to sign a release 
and refusing to deal with the Crookstons there-
after, leaving the Crookstons personally 
exposed to further proceedings by the Bank. 
(R. 2317) 
f. Representing that the Phipps bid was 
adequate and all that was owing under the poli-
cy, when there were clearly other coverages and 
amounts owing thereunder. (R. 2317-18, 2320-21, 
1917-22) 
g. Refusing to include the insureds' 
name on a settlement check in payment of a 
substantial amount of money. (R. 2321-22) 
h. Representing that engineer Rich's 
report was a complete analysis of damage, when 
it was not. (R. 2324-25) 
i. Using the Crookstons' failure to sign 
a proof of loss form as grounds for denying 
their claims, particularly where the Crookstons 
were not provided with such a form, and ade-
quate evidence of the loss had been provided to 
Fire Insurance. (R. 2325) 
j. Rejecting the bids of Brewster, Stal-
lings and Jones because of insufficient detail, 
without requesting the additional information 
and detail. (R. 2326-27) 
k. Failing to disclose to the Crookstons 
that Fire Insurance was rejecting the other 
bids and the reasons therefor. (R. 2327-29) 
1. Not communicating with the Crookstons 
during the entire adjusting process. (R. 2329) 
m. Refusing to consider additional 
claims of the Crookstons after settling with 
the Bank, denying responsibility to the insur-
ance commissioner when a complaint was filed by 
the Crookstons, and forcing the Crookstons to 
bring legal action. (R. 2330-31) 
n. Refusing to clean up after the col-
lapse even after the city had given notice and 
threatened to condemn the property due to the 
hazardous situation. (R. 2332) 
o. Delaying over six months while the 
Crookston home was unfit for occupation, before 
making any attempts to settle. (R. 2333) 
p. Maintaining a company policy that the 
only duty of an adjuster is to protect the 
financial interest of the insurance company and 
not the insured. (R. 1894-95, 2333) 
22. In an attempt to seek redress without filing a legal 
action, the Crookstons complained to the Utah Insurance Department 
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shortly before October 18, 1982. (R. 2226; Ex. 9, pp. 24-27) Fire 
Insurance responded on November 2, 1982, and denied that any amount 
was owing to the Crooks tons. (Ex. 9, pp. 28-31) The insurance 
department finally responded on January 10, 1983, stating that it 
did not have the resources to resolve this dispute and suggested 
that the Crookstons proceed with legal action. (R. 1726; Ex. 9, p. 
32) 
23. The Crookstons were a typical young married couple 
with two children. Each had a very strong work ethic, having worked 
most of their lives. (R. 1995, 2391-92) Mr. Crookston had been a 
certified surgical technician who worked in surgery at the LDS 
Hospital for approximately six years. (Ex. 37; R. 1995-2000) 
Obtaining a degree would have substantially increased his income. 
(R. 1998, 2462-63) Prior to the settlement with the Bank, Mr. 
Crookston was working two other jobs and was attending the Univer-
sity of Utah part-time in order to obtain a degree* (R. 1997-2000, 
2017) The Crookstons were financially meeting all of their obliga-
tions until the Bank proceeded with collection of the balance owing 
on the construction loan. (R. 1839, 2018, 2394) 
24. After the settlement, the Crookstons lost all their 
savings and everything they had put into the property. Mr. 
Crookston had a mental collapse, has been unable to complete his 
education and be gainfully employed as he had been prior to the 
settlement. (R. 1711, 2124-27, 2197) Paul Randle, economist, 
computed the present value of the Crookstons' total economic loss 
since June, 1982, to be $323,399, which amount included some loss of 
14 
income during the three years after trial while Mr. Crookston 
recovered, obtained his degree and became fully employed again. 
(Ex's. 1-5; R. 2458-68) 
25. At trial, evidence of Fire Insurance's claims prac-
tices and business philosophy was presented through testimony of its 
adjustors and supervisor and through the memoranda, correspondence, 
diary, and other documents in the Fire Insurance claim file. The 
important points include: 
a. Prior to his insurance work, Kent 
Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor, had worked 
as a loan officer for a bank and was generally 
aware of the Bank's foreclosure rights under 
its deed of trust. (R. 1942) 
b. Both Soderquist and Clapperton were 
well aware that if insurance proceeds were not 
timely and adequately paid, the Bank would 
foreclose unless the insureds were able to pay 
the underlying loan. (R. 1943, 2236-39, 2265) 
c. Fire Insurance had actual knowledge 
that the Bank was proceeding to foreclose on 
the Crookstons' property. (R. 2277-79; Exhibit 
15 p. 3) 
d. Fire Insurance ratified and approved 
all of the actions taken by Moser, Clapperton 
and Soderquist. The witnesses testifying in 
behalf of Fire Insurance admitted that those 
involved were acting within the scope of their 
employment and that their activities were 
consistent with company policy. (R. 1888-89, 
2235) Mr. Moser, who has since been made a 
supervisor (R. 1968-69), testified that the 
handling of the Crookstons' claim was done 
according to company policy, was appropriate, 
and was handled in a fashion similar to the 
handling of other claims. (R. 2588-89) The 
Pocatello regional office and the district 
branch claims manager had reviewed the claims 
file routinely during all relevant times and 
had made various communications to the adjus-
ters. (Exhibits 11, 12 and 13) 
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e. Mr. Soderquist, the supervisor at the 
time of the loss, described the claims adjust-
ing philosophy of not just Fire Insurance but 
for all Farmer's Insurance Group: 
Q: Now, what is Mr. Moser's duty as it 
relates to the loss itself? Does he have 
any duty at all to try and find out on his 
own what the loss is? . . . 
A: Technically and literally according to the 
conditions of the policy, as I would 
interpret it, Mr. Moser's only duty was to 
the insurance company, which would be to 
obtain information to protect the insur-
ance company's interest. . . Any efforts 
that Mr. Moser made to help the insured to 
prove their loss would be beyond the scope 
of his actual duties as an adjuster. 
Q: . . . Are you saying that the adjuster, 
Mr. Moser, has no duty to try on his own 
to determine the amount of the loss? 
A: Yes, he does, to protect the insurance 
company's interests. 
Q: . . . Do you feel that Mr. Moser's duty 
was in any way designed to try and protect 
the Crookstons or to help them? 
A: Technically, I don't think an adjuster's 
duty is to protect the interests of the 
insured. I think all insurance companies 
do that as a public relations matter, but, 
technically they are not required to. 
Q: Was this the position taken by Mr. Moser 
and you in the Crookston case? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 1893-95; 1885) 
f. The witnesses for Fire Insurance 
testified that they believed they had treated 
the Crookstons fairly. (R. 1937) In fact, 
Clapperton had the audacity to expressly state 
that he felt good about what he did to the 
Crookstons! (R. 2286) Fire Insurance has 
twice promoted Clapperton since this incident. 
He is now the district claims manager supervis-
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ing the adjustment of all claims in northern 
Utah. (R. 2231-32) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991), this Court clarified the relative roles of trial and 
appellate courts reviewing a Rule 59(a)(5) motion for new trial or 
remittitur. The trial court has the primary responsibility to 
determine whether the jury acted with passion or prejudice, having 
the advantage of being present at trial. The appellate court does 
not review the jury award directly but rules on the propriety of the 
trial court's ruling on the motion, reversing the trial judge only 
if the trial court had no reasonable basis for its decision. 
The historically approved ratios of punitive to compensa-
tory damages are not "bright line" ceilings which have the potential 
of frustrating the goals of punitive damages — punishment and 
deterrence. The trial judge may deny a motion for new trial or 
remittitur where the ratio is greater than that historically 
approved but must state the reasons therefor in order to permit this 
Court to conduct its review of the reasonableness of the decision. 
Extreme malice and the probability of recurrence are two factors 
which could justify a greater award. The issue here is whether 
Judge Frederick had a reasonable basis for his decision again 
denying Fire Insurance's motion. 
This Court has emphasized in prior decisions that the 
relationship between the actual and punitive damages was only one 
factor to be considered and that trial courts must examine at least 
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three other principal areas to determine whether an award is appro-
priate: (1) the nature of the defendant's acts, (2) the probability 
of recurrence, and (3) the wealth of the defendant. Judge Frederick 
determined that (1) Fire Insurance acted with a high degree of 
malice, (2) that it was very likely to repeat its malicious conduct 
in the absence of a punitive award, and (3) that a large award was 
appropriate in view of Fire Insurance's wealth. 
As directed by this Court, Judge Frederick reviewed the 
"soft" compensatory damages and found them to be appropriate in view 
of the nature of the harm the Crookstons suffered and the malicious 
conduct involved. All factors other than the presumptive ratio 
militate in favor of upholding the verdict. Judge Frederick right-
fully concluded that the ratio should not subsume consideration of 
all other factors. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to submit the 
ratio to a new jury. This Court did not mandate that the jury be so 
instructed and, it would be unwise to do so. The Court gave the 
trial court ample guidance to determine whether the* jury's award was 
appropriate and the trial court could have reduced the award if he 
deemed it appropriate. Fire Insurance is improperly inviting this 
Court to review de novo the evidence directly rather than review the 
trial court's decision. 
Fire Insurance's claim that it has been punished enough by 
its payment of compensatory damages is illogical. Under this 
theory, the defendant who acts most maliciously and inflicts the 
most injury has the least fear of paying punitive damages. 
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Fire Insurance's contention that Judge Frederick improper-
ly relied on evidence outside the record is without foundation. The 
trial court's findings and conclusions were legitimate and reason-
able inferences drawn from evidence and life's experience. 
This punitive award sends society's message to Fire 
Insurance, and the insurance industry as a whole, in the language 
they understand best — the language of money. 
ARGUMENT 
The Crookstons have divided this brief into three princi-
pal sections. In Section 1 (Points I and II) , the Crookstons review 
the procedural and substantive holdings of Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), hereafter "Crookston.11 
In Section 2 (Points III through VIII), the Crookstons demonstrate 
why Judge Frederick did not abuse his discretion in denying Fire 
Insurance's motion for a new trial or remittitur. In Section 3 
(Points IX through XIV), the Crookstons respond to points raised in 
Fire Insurance's principal brief. 
I. IN CROOKSTON, THIS COURT DELINEATED THE RELATIVE 
ROLES OF THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT WHEN 
REVIEWING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR REMITTITUR. 
In Crookston. this Court noted its dissatisfaction with 
the inconsistent standards it had previously employed to review 
trial court dispositions of Rule 59(a)(5) motions. Crookston, 817 
P.2d at 802. In some cases the Court had focused on the trial 
court's ruling, while in others, the Court appeared to review the 
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jury award directly. The Court thereafter clarified the relative 
roles of the trial and appellate courts. Ibid. 
A. The Trial Court Exercises Supervisory Control Over the Jury to 
Ensure Justice. 
1. The jury award must meet the trial court/s approval. 
In Crookston, this Court, citing Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Yeatts. 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941), reiterated the well 
established principle that jurors "are not, and have never been, 
independent of the court of which they are a part, but their 
verdicts must meet the approval, or at least they must not offend 
the sense of justice, of the presiding judge" who, in essence, sits 
as the "thirteenth juror." Crookston, at 803, fn. 15. The trial 
judge's responsibility is to ensure justice: 
We have indeed frequently affirmed the impor-
tance of trial by jury. However, it must be 
realized that even a jury is not so sacrosanct 
as to be beyond the possibility of error. Like 
other aspects of authority in our system of 
government under law, it is essential that 
there be some check against arbitrariness, 
abuse or mistake. The safeguard against this 
is the authority of the trial judge who has 
supervisory control over the proceedings and is 
charged with the ultimate responsibility of 
seeing that justice is done. To accomplish 
that purpose it is essential that his power to 
grant or deny motions for new trial be recog-
nized. 
Hvland Hospital v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 
736, 738 (1967). 
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2. Because the trial court occupies an advantaged 
position, it has the primary responsibility of 
reviewing the award to determine if it is 
excessive. 
In Crookston. this Court emphasized that the trial court 
has the primary responsibility of reviewing the amount of punitive 
damage awards, because the trial court is best equipped to perform 
the review: 
The reason that any determination as to whether 
the jury exceeded its proper bounds is best 
made in the first instance by the trial court 
is that the trial judge is present during all 
aspects of the trial and listens to and views 
all witnesses. Therefore, he or she can best 
determine if the jury has acted with "passion 
or prejudice" and whether the award was too 
small or too large in light of the evidence. 
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 804. 
B. This Court Reviews the Propriety of the Trial Courtis Ruling on 
a Motion for New Trial. 
1. This Court neither retries facts nor reviews 
the jury award directly. 
In Crookston, the Court reiterated the long-standing 
principle that the Court "do[es] not sit to retry the facts." 
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 800. Furthermore, the Court's proper role is 
to review the trial court's ruling rather than the jury verdict 
directly. Id. at 813. In performing this review, the appellate 
court accords the trial court deference due to the trial judge's 
advantaged position to "appraise the witnesses and the evidence." 
Id. at 811. Accordingly, this Court reverses the trial court ruling 
on the motion only where the Court determines that the trial court 
had no reasonable basis for its decision. Id. at 805. 
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2. The trial court must articulate the 
basis for its ruling. 
Although the Court gives deference to the trial court's 
ruling, the trial court must articulate the basis for its decision. 
Id. at 804, citing Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 178 
(1940) . The reasons for this requirement are thrcse-fold. First, 
the articulation requires the trial court to carefully review and 
analyze the trial in terms of the facts and the law to reach a 
reasoned decision. ("The exercise of judicial discretion must be 
based upon some facts notwithstanding great latitude* is accorded the 
trial court in such matters." Saltas. 105 P.2d at 178). Second, 
the requirement allows the appellate court to review the trial 
court's decision without having to peruse the evidence, the record, 
and the instructions "to search out possible reasons for agreeing or 
disagreeing with the trial court in the exercise of a discretion." 
Ibid. Third, the requirement functions as "a mechanism for the 
further development of the law." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 813. Taken 
as a whole, the process ensures reasoned review of the motion at 
both trial and appellate court levels. 
II. THE COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THAT A TRIAL COURT 
NEED NOT NECESSARILY GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR 
REMITTITUR IF THE PUNITIVE AWARD EXCEEDS 
HISTORICALLY APPROVED RATIOS. 
After having established the relative roles of the trial 
judge and appellate court, the Court in Crookston discussed the 
substantive standards applicable to a punitive damage award. The 
Court first noted that historically it had identified seven factors 
to be considered: 
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(1) The relative wealth of the defendant; 
(2) the nature of the alleged misconduct; 
(3) the facts and circumstances surrounding 
such conduct; 
(4) the effect thereof on the lives of the 
plaintiff and others; 
(5) the probability of future recurrence of 
the misconduct; 
(6) the relationship of the parties; and 
(7) the amount of actual damages awarded. 
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808. Thereafter, the Court commented: 
Our cases have done little more than list these 
factors. No relative weights have been assign-
ed them, and no standards or formulas have been 
established for properly evaluating them when 
making an award or when reviewing the propen-
sity [sic] of a jury award. 
Ibid. 
The Court further observed that other courts had struggled 
with similar difficulties and that some jurisdictions had resorted 
to "bright line" limits on punitive damages. However, the Court 
opined that "bright line" standards, while having the advantage of 
certainty, also have the disadvantage of inflexibility, which "could 
potentially defeat the very purpose of punitive damages." Id. at 
809. After discussing the weaknesses inherent in the "strict list 
of factors" approach and the "ceiling" approach standing alone, the 
Court adopted a "middle ground." Ibid. 
Based on prior cases, the Court determined that: 
The general rule to be drawn from our past 
cases appears to be that where the punitives 
are well below $100,000, punitive damages 
beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages have 
seldom been upheld and that where the award is 
in excess of $100,000, we have indicated some 
inclination to overturn awards having ratios of 
less than 3 to 1. 
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Id. at 810. However, recognizing the inherent weakness of the 
"bright line" approach, the Court held that a trial court is not 
bound by the "presumptive ratio:" 
In these patterns, we find that guidelines 
emerge for trial courts faced with challenges 
to punitive damage awards on the grounds of 
excessiveness under rule 59(a)(5). If the 
ratio of punitive to actual damages falls 
within the range that this court has consis-
tently upheld, then the trial court may assume 
that the award is not excessive. In denying a 
rule 59(a) (5) motion for a new trial, the trial 
court need not give any detailed explanation 
for its decision if the punitive damage award 
falls within this ratio range. If the award 
exceeds the ratios set by our past pattern of 
decision, the trial court is not bound to 
reduce it. However, if such an award is up-
held, the trial judge must make a detailed and 
reasoned articulation of the grounds for con-
cluding that the award is not excessive in 
light of the law and the facts. The judge's 
articulation should generally be couched in 
terms of one or more of the seven factors we 
earlier listed as proper considerations in 
determining the amount of punitive dcimages. 
unless some other factor seems compelling to 
the trial court, [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 811. The Court explicitly noted such factors as extreme 
malice or the need for deterrence as bases for denying a Rule 59 
motion even where the ratio of the punitive award to compensatory 
damages was larger than that historically approved. Ibid. 
In remanding Fire Insurance's motion to the trial court, 
this Court stated that it was not expressing any opinion as to 
whether a remittitur should be granted. However, it did note that 
if the trial court did again deny the motion, the trial court should 
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explain its reasons for doing so under the standards set out in 
Crookston. Id. at 812. 
Since the trial court has again denied Fire Insurance's 
motion, it is the Court's duty to review the ruling to determine 
whether Judge Frederick had a reasonable basis for his decision. 
III. WHERE THE PUNITIVE AWARD EXCEEDS HISTORICALLY 
APPROVED RATIOS, THE COURT SHOULD EXAMINE THREE 
PRINCIPAL AREAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE AWARD 
IS EXCESSIVE. 
The Court did not discuss the framework it would utilize 
in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial where 
the punitive award exceeded the presumptive ratio. However, the 
tenor of the opinion appeared to invite further development of the 
law once the trial court had made its ruling: 
Finally, through the requirement of an articu-
lation of reasons for sustaining or modifying 
damage awards, we establish a mechanism for the 
further development of the law. 
Id. at 813. Crookstons submit that the trial court's ruling should 
be evaluated against a framework derived from prior case law. 
The middle ground approach taken in Crookston is consis-
tent with this Court's prior decisions holding that the relationship 
between compensatory and punitive damages is not the sole criterion 
in determining whether a punitive award is excessive. In Terry v. 
Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) 
(reversed on other grounds, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980)), the jury 
awarded general damages of $2,500 and punitive damages of $15,000 
against ZCMI for false arrest and imprisonment. The trial judge 
reduced the punitive award, stating that the punitive damages had to 
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bear a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages. On 
appeal, this Court reinstated the jury's punitive award, noting that 
exclusive reliance on the relationship test frustrates the purposes 
of punitive damages: 
This court recently stated that "while the 
cases generally hold that the amount of puni-
tive damages must bear some reasonable relation 
to the amount of actual damages awarded, this 
is not necessarily true." The purposes of a 
punitive or exemplary damage award is not to 
compensate the party harmed but rather to 
punish the wrongdoer, to deter him from similar 
acts in the future, and to provide fair warning 
to others similarly situated that such conduct 
will not be tolerated. 
Due to the purposes underlying the award of 
punitive damages many factors contribute in 
determining their appropriate measure. While 
the amount of compensatory damages awarded is 
one such factor, it is not the exclusive one. 
The jury in its original decision or the court 
in its review of that decision must also con-
sider the particular nature of the defendant's 
acts, the probability of those acts being 
repeated in the future, and the relative wealth 
of the particular defendant. [Emphasis cidded.] 
Id. at 328. The Court's approach in Terry provides the model for 
analysis here. Where the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages is higher than that historically recognized, this Court 
should focus on the trial court's conclusions as to the nature of 
defendant's acts, the probability of recurrence, and defendant's 
wealth. Judge Frederick's ruling was reasonable when considered in 
light of his findings that Fire Insurance acted with a high degree 
of malice, that there was a significant probability that the conduct 
would recur, and that Fire Insurance's wealth justified a 
significant punitive award. 
26 
IV. JUDGE FREDERICK CONCLUDED THAT FIRE INSURANCE 
ACTED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF MALICE. 
A. This Court Has Held that Fire Insurance Acted With the Requi-
site Mental State for Punitive Damages. 
In Crookston, the Court repeated the well-established 
principle that punitive damages are allowed only where there is 
willful and malicious conduct or conduct which manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of 
others. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807. The Court affirmed Judge 
Fredericks finding that punitive damages were appropriate: 
[W]e hold that the trial court correctly con-
cluded that Fire Insurance had acted with the 
mental state required for punitives. 
Ibid. 
B. The Size of the Punitive Award Should Reflect the Degree of 
Reprehensibilitv of the Conduct. 
The law recognizes that within the realm of egregious 
conduct, there are differing degrees of reprehensibility: 
One factor is the particular nature of the 
defendant's acts in light of the whole record; 
clearly, different acts may be of varying 
degrees of reprehensibility, and the more 
reprehensible the act, the greater the appro-
priate punishment, assuming all other factors 
are equal. 
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 582 P.2d 980, 990 (Cal. 1978), 
cited in Terry. supra, at 328 fn. 54. Both the jury and trial court 
found that the acts of Fire Insurance were egregious and 
reprehensible. 
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C. Fire Insurance Preyed Upon the Crookstons When They Were in a 
State of Helplessness. 
This Court has generally upheld punitive awards where the 
plaintiff was disadvantaged in some respect at the time of defen-
dant's anti-social behavior. See, Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 
(Utah 1985) — plaintiff, an older gentlemen, was under pressure of 
foreclosure when approached by defrauder; Elkinaton v. Foust, 618 
P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) — stepdaughter abused by stepfather from age 9 
to age 16; and Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952) 
— plaintiff in delicate health at time of assault. 
Here, the trial court found that the Crookstons were 
particularly vulnerable when Fire Insurance engaged in this fraud. 
After their home had collapsed, Crookstons had no means to pay the 
bank loan and were being forced into bankruptcy. R. 03203. The 
Court further found that Fire Insurance's conduct was especially 
reprehensible in light of the nature of Fire Insurance's business, 
the selling of hope to those injured by calamitous events. R. 
03239. 
Fire Insurance, invited the Crookstons to purchase insur-
ance on the assumption that Fire Insurance would provide "fast, 
fair, friendly service" in their hour of need. However, when called 
upon to perform, Fire Insurance victimized the Crookstons. It takes 
a particularly insensitive and calloused attitude to engage in this 
genre of reprehensible behavior. 
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D. The Trial Court Noted an Astonishing Moral Blindness Among Fire 
Insurance's Employees, 
In his memorandum decision, Judge Frederick found that: 
Fire Insurance's adjusters acknowledged that the purpose of insur-
ance was to prevent extreme financial hardship and loss of property 
which would otherwise occur if a claim is not paid; Clapperton and 
the other adjusters knew that Crookstons faced foreclosure if Fire 
Insurance did not perform; notwithstanding this knowledge, 
Clapperton acted with total indifference to the Crookston's plight. 
R. 03203(a). 
Fire Insurance remained insensitive to the Crookstons at 
trial, where Moser testified that Fire Insurance had treated the 
Crookstons fairly; Clapperton, the perpetrator of the fraud, had the 
audacity to testify that he "felt good" about what he had done to 
the Crookstons; and incredibly Fire Insurance's representatives 
testified that they considered their activities to be sound business 
practices. R. 03203(a)-03204. 
This apparent moral blindness was not confined to the Utah 
claims office. Judge Frederick observed that the regional office 
and district branch claims manager reviewed the claims files 
routinely, communicated with the adjusters, and ratified and 
approved of all actions taken by its agents. R. 03203(a). 
In view of all the testimony, Judge Frederick concluded: 
The evidence supporting Fire Insurance's posi-
tion with regard to the adjustment of the 
Crookstons' claim and Fire Insurance's apparent 
satisfaction with the manner in which its own 
insureds were treated represents both to this 
Court and apparently to the jury, that ill-
will, malice and/or total indifference to the 
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Crookstons was its attitude. Having sought an 
inadequate bid, and having excluded the 
Crookstons from the negotiations, Fire 
Insurance was in total control of the settle-
ment with the bank. Knowing that the settle-
ment would have a devastating impact on the 
Crookstons, Clapperton nevertheless proceeded 
in a fraudulent, malicious fashion with one 
goal in mind: to cheat the plaintiffs out of 
their just due and thereby presumably improve 
his standing with his employer. By their 
actions, the agents and representatives of Fire 
Insurance demonstrated either actual malice and 
ill will toward the Crookstons and intended the 
consequence of their actions, or Fire 
Insurance7s agents acted wrongfully, solely to 
further their own financial well-being, despite 
actual knowledge of devastating harm to the 
Crookstons. 
R. 03207-03208. Judge Frederick reiterated his view of the extreme 
degree of malice shown by Fire Insurance later in his opinion, 
stating: 
Moreover, it is this Court's view that Fire 
Insurance has displayed an extremely high 
degree of malice, with actual intent to harm 
for the benefit of its own financial interests, 
or at the very least, a high degree of likeli-
hood of great harm to the plaintiffs based upon 
the reprehensible nature of the acts involved. 
R. 03217. 
V. JUDGE FREDERICK IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT FACTORS 
WHICH PORTEND A RECURRENCE OF FIRE INSURANCE'S 
CONDUCT. 
A. The Court Should Examine the Probability of Recurrence in Terms 
of Opportunity, Incentive, Potential Restraints and Attitude. 
As noted in Terry, one of the primary purposes of punitive 
damages is to deter the defendant and others similarly situated from 
repeating anti-social behavior. Hence, although the probability of 
recurrence is only one of the list of factors noted by the Court in 
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Crookston, the Court should give significant weight to it. The 
punitive award should be proportionate to the likelihood that the 
conduct may recur to prevent further harm to society. In its cases, 
the Court has identified several considerations relevant to the 
probability of recurrence. 
1. Opportunity. 
The Court indirectly referred to opportunity in Bundy v. 
Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984), where the 
Court reduced the punitive damages, stating that the conduct 
occurred in circumstances so unique that it was unlikely that the 
conduct would be repeated. However, the converse is also true. 
Where the circumstances are likely to recur with frequency, the 
perpetrator may well be tempted to repeat his conduct. 
2. Incentive. 
This Court has previously held that a punitive award must 
be sufficient to deter a defendant who engages in malicious conduct 
for financial gain. In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 
P.2d 1179, 1187 (Utah 1983), the Court stated that punitive damages 
must be appropriate to "take the profit out of wrongdoing." 
3. Availability of other restraints. 
Punitive damages are designed to deter "outrageous and 
malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by other 
means." Behrens, supra, at 1186. To the extent that there are 
other mechanisms available to deter wrongful conduct, punitive 
damages assume a smaller role. By contrast, where there appears to 
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be no other reasonable restraints, punitive damages assume much 
greater importance. 
4. The defendant's attitude. 
Although the Court has not heretofore focused on the 
defendants attitude in reviewing the probability of recurrence, it 
seems apparent that the defendant's attitude is significant. If a 
defendant fails to recognize the anti-social nature of the prior 
acts, it is more likely that the defendant will continue the illegal 
behavior unless checked. 
B. The Trial Court Found Factors Which Pointed to a Probability 
that Fire Insurance Would Continue Its Malicious Behavior. 
1. Opportunity. 
Judge Frederick noted that Fire Insurance has four claims 
offices located in Utah, each of which handles 4,000 to 5,000 claims 
a year. R. 03211. Each of these 16,000 to 20,000 yearly claims 
presents an opportunity for Fire Insurance to engage in wrongful 
conduct for profit. 
2. Incentive. 
Judge Frederick wrote: 
In the absence of punitive damages, Fire 
Insurance may well find that it is profitable 
to continue its illegal conduct, even though it 
may incur the cost of compensatory damages from 
time to time. 
R. 03211. 
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3- Availability of restraints. 
Judge Frederick determined there was a significant lack of 
internal restraints on Fire Insurance. Its management ratified 
Clapperton's conduct and, indeed, appeared to applaud the conduct by 
twice promoting Clapperton, who now serves as claims manager for all 
claims processed in northern Utah. R. 03203(a)-03204. Fire 
Insurance also ignored an external check on its conduct. After 
Clapperton closed his file, the Crookstons appealed to the insurance 
department for assistance. This regulatory agency had no deterrent 
effect on Fire Insurance, as evidenced by Fire Insurance's denial of 
any liability to the Crookstons. R. 03240. 
4. Attitude. 
Judge Frederick found that Fire Insurance acted with a 
high degree of malice. Significantly, Judge Frederick recorded that 
at trial, nearly six years after the incident, Fire Insurance was 
not the least inclined to change its practices: 
It is the view of this Court, that Fire 
Insurance's conduct and lack of remorse inci-
dent thereto demonstrate a calculated and 
calloused attitude toward the settlement of 
claims, and this is in accord with what agents 
of Fire Insurance perceive to be in keeping 
with their company policy. 
* * * 
There was no evidence at all at trial that the 
practices and procedures involved have in any 
manner been changed by Fire Insurance. There 
was no indication of contrition or remorse, 
and, in fact, it appeared that Fire Insurance 
was pleased with the outcome of the adjustment 
of the loss, and to this day has failed or 
refused to recognize the wrong that it has 
wrought upon the plaintiffs. 
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R. 03211, 03217. 
5. Reasonable Conclusions. 
In view of the evidence, it was certainly reasonable for 
Judge Frederick to conclude that there was a great risk that Fire 
Insurance would continue to engage in wrongful conduct absent a 
significant punitive damage award. Fire Insurance had the oppor-
tunity to continue its conduct in view of the thousands of claims 
processed annually. Fire Insurance certainly has the incentive to 
maximize its profits. There are no internal constraints, and Fire 
Insurance ignored the regulatory agency's attempts. Finally, and 
most importantly, in view of the attitudes manifested at trial, the 
jury and the trial court were well within their province to conclude 
that a large punitive damage award was society's only tool to check 
Fire Insurance. 
VI. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE IN 
LIGHT OF FIRE INSURANCE'S WEALTH. 
A. The Term "Relative Wealth" Has Various Meanings, Each Relevant 
to a Determination of the Propriety of a Punitive Damage Award. 
The phrase "relative wealth" has no meaning until one 
defines the subject to which the wealth is compared. Historically, 
the Court has compared a defendants wealth to the punitive award 
itself. However, other comparisons are also meaningful. 
1. Defendants wealth relative to the punitive award. 
When comparing the defendant's wealth to the punitive 
award, the Court has attempted to achieve a balance between 
deterrence and the defendant's ability to pay. This balancing was 
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most clearly demonstrated in Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1983). In Cruz, the defendant had battered the plaintiff after an 
argument in a restaurant. The jury awarded the plaintiff special 
damages of $580, general damages of $9,000, and punitive damages of 
$12,000. In discussing the deterrent effect of punitive damages, 
the Court wrote: 
Punitive damages should be more than an incon-
venience to [the defendant]. Their amount 
should be sufficient to discourage him, or 
anyone similarly situated, from repeating such 
conduct in the future. 
Id. at 727. The Court noted that the defendant, a salaried police 
officer, had a semi-monthly disposable income of $567.05. Since 
there had been no evidence at trial relative to the defendant's 
assets, the Court reduced the punitive award to $6,000. However, 
the Court cautioned: 
This reduction should in no way be taken to 
condone [the defendant's] deplorable actions. 
Ibid. Although the Court may reduce an award which is excessive in 
comparison to the defendant's resources, the damage award must be of 
sufficient size relative to the defendant's wealth to achieve its 
deterrent effect. 
2. Defendant's wealth relative to the plaintiff. 
Although not previously noted by the Court, there is a 
meaningful comparison between the wealth of the defendant and the 
plaintiff. In our society, wealth equates to power, and where there 
is a great disparity between the wealth of the defendant and the 
plaintiff, the defendant may tend to exploit its wealth to oppress 
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the weaker plaintiff, particularly when the plaintiff is financially 
destitute. 
3. Defendants wealth relative to society. 
Since wealth equates to power, a wealthy defendant has the 
capacity to affect many lives. Thus, when there is a probability 
that a wealthy defendant will repeat its conduct, there is a greater 
risk to society as a whole both in terms of the extent and severity 
of harm. 
B. The Trial Courtis Ruling Was Reasonable in Light of the 
"Relative Wealth" Analysis. 
1. Wealth relative to the punitive award. 
As noted by Judge Frederick, during 1986, the year preced-
ing the trial, Fire Insurance's total assets were $723,468,116; its 
total underwriting, investment and other income was $595,284,582, 
and its net income was $23,000,000. R. 03204. Judge Frederick then 
compared the punitive award of $4 million to Fire Insurance's total 
assets and observed that the punitive award constituted approximate-
ly one-half of one percent of its assets. R. 03205. 
Because the amount is large in the abstract, Fire 
Insurance desires to focus only on the total punitives of $4,000,000 
without putting it into context. However, the pertinent inquiry is 
relative wealth. 
The ratio of the punitive award to each of the foregoing 
figures is as follows: 
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Punitive damages to total assets 
4,000,000 -5- 723,468,116 = .55% 
Punitive damages to total annual income 
4,000,000 -f 595,284,582 = .67% 
Punitive damages to net annual income 
4,000,000 4- 23,000,000 = 17.4% 
In view of the Court's prior caselaw, a punitive award amounting to 
17% of a defendant's annual net income is not excessive. In Cruz, 
supra, this Court, without evidence of the defendant's assets, 
reduced the punitive damage award from $12,000 (88% of the defen-
dant's net annual income) to $6,000 (44% of the net annual income). 
Here, the evidence demonstrated that Fire Insurance had three-
quarters of a billion dollars in assets and the punitive award, as 
a percentage of Fire Insurance's net income, was less than one-half 
of that approved in Cruz. 
Most individuals are not accustomed to dealing in millions 
of dollars. However, multi-million dollar corporations deal with 
millions like individuals deal with hundreds or thousands. There-
fore, "relative wealth" is best illustrated by moving the decimal of 
each figure to the left by 3 digits: $723,468 compared to $4,000; 
$595,468 compared to $4,000; $23,000 compared to $4,000. The ratios 
are still the same and appear quite acceptable. No one could 
seriously consider excessive a $4,000 punitive award against a 
defendant who possesses assets of $723,000. While taking $4,000 
from that defendant's $23,000 annual income may sting, that is the 
purpose of punitive damages. In any event, the assets available to 
defendant obviously compensate. 
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2. Fire Insurance's wealth relative to 
the Crookstons. 
The trial court noted the enormous disparity in the 
resources available to Fire Insurance and the Crookstons: 
It goes without saying that there is no 
rational comparison between Fire Insurance's 
assets and income to that of plaintiffs. They 
are bankrupt. 
R. 03205. This large corporation, having assets of three quarters 
of a billion dollars, literally crushed the Crookstons. The fact 
that this case has been in litigation for more than nine years amply 
attests to Fire Insurance's ability to oppress and try the 
plaintiffs' emotional and financial endurance. 
3. Fire Insurance's wealth relative to society. 
Fire Insurance does a substantial amount of business in 
our country. It operates four claims offices in this state, each 
office processing approximately 4,000 to 5,000 claims annually. 
Unless restrained, Fire Insurance with its substantial resources 
poses a significant threat to society in terms of the number people 
potentially affected and the nature of harm inflicted. 
VII. JUDGE FREDERICK REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
PUNITIVE AWARD WAS JUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE 
HARD AND SOFT COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. 
In Crookston, the Court expressed some skepticism 
regarding "soft" compensatory damages because of the inherent 
difficulty of attaching a value to them. In remanding the motion, 
this Court stated that if Judge Frederick again denied defendant's 
motion for new trial or remittitur, he must explain the reasons for 
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the denial "given the large proportion of compensatory damages 
arguably attributable to emotional distress or loss of financial 
reputation." Id. at p. 812. However, the Court did not give the 
trial court any guidance as to what standard Judge Frederick should 
employ to determine whether the "soft" damages were suspect. 
Nevertheless, after examining this issue, Judge Frederick expressly 
determined that the "soft" damages awarded were appropriate. 
A. The Extent and Nature of Crookstons/ "Soft" Damages Were Real 
and Were to Be Reasonably Expected Given Fire Insurance's Malicious 
Behavior. 
After reviewing the evidence, the trial court stated: 
The plaintiffs each testified at trial to the 
devastating effect the actions of Fire Insur-
ance had on their personal lives. They suf-
fered serious emotional and nervous conditions, 
which were of long-standing nature, and the 
devastation testified to continued from the 
date of the loss, at least through the trial 
(approximately six years). In addition, the 
plaintiffs were forced to file bankruptcy and 
lost, as a result, all of their savings and the 
lot they had purchased upon which to build 
their "dream home." 
R. 03208-03209. The effect of Fire Insurance's malicious behavior 
extended beyond the Crookstons, affecting the plaintiffs' parents, 
the Crookston's creditors, the bank, subcontractors, and ultimately 
the city which was forced to remove the hazardous condition posed to 
the neighborhood children by the devastated home. Ibid. 
In referring to his own impressions regarding the evi-
dence, Judge Frederick wrote: 
Though the amount of so-called "soft" damages 
comprises approximately 60% of the total com-
pensatory damage award, those damages were 
nevertheless real, and represented suffering 
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and loss sustained by plaintiffs. The plain-
tiffs' emotional distress was severe and of 
long-standing duration. The jury was instruct-
ed as to what properly constitutes emotional 
distress, pain and suffering. The Supreme 
Court has affirmed that determination by the 
jury as being well within their discretion. 
This Court's view is that the jury's finding 
was appropriate and supported by the evidence. 
The problem is not that emotional harm should 
not be compensated, but how to insure that the 
damages awarded are commensurate with the emo-
tional harm. In addressing the problem, courts 
often consider whether there is physical harm 
associated with the mental harm. Courts also 
examine the conduct of the defendant to deter-
mine whether emotional harm will naturally and 
reasonably follow therefrom. 
The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and 
outrageous. There is nothing fictitious or 
trivial about the Crookstons' bankruptcy and 
the loss of their home and property. Given the 
egregious conduct and succeeding events, there 
is no doubt that the Crookstons' claims for 
mental distress are real, unfeigned, and far 
from trivial and therefore should be viewed as 
real damage. [Emphasis added.] 
R. 03215, 03216. There is no doubt that Judge Frederick was 
satisfied that in view of the harm inflicted on the Crookstons, the 
jury's award of "soft" compensatory damages was appropriate. 
B. Based on an Historical Review, the Ratio of the "Soft" to 
"Hard" Damages Demonstrates That Judge Frederick's Decision Was 
Reasonable. 
In Crookston, the Court expressed its concern that the 
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages not be skewed by a 
disproportionate award of "soft" damages. This Court can verify the 
propriety of Judge Frederick's conclusion regarding the compensatory 
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damages by employing an historical analysis analogous to that 
developed in Crookston. 
In Cruz v, Montova. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), this Court 
reduced the punitive award based principally on the defendant's lack 
of resources. However, the Court also observed that the jury had 
been generous in the award of general damages. In Cruz, the jury 
had awarded $580 "special" damages, (i.e, economic loss) and $9,000 
general damages, (i.e. pain and suffering). The ratio of the 
general damages to special damages in Cruz was a little more than 
15:1. Cruz stands for the proposition that general damages in a 
ratio of 15:1 to economic loss are "generous." 
On the other hand, where the conduct has been egregious 
and the nature of the resulting harm was reasonably expected, the 
Court has upheld punitive damages where the ratio of general to 
special damages has been as large as 3.8:1. In Elkincrton v. Foust, 
618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), the plaintiff brought an action against her 
father who had sexually assaulted her during her youth. The jury 
awarded $2,600 special damages and $10,000 general damages. This 
Court upheld the punitive award as not being excessive in view of 
the innate evils of the conduct and the far reaching harm on the 
plaintiff and others. 
In this case, Judge Frederick noted that Crookstons' 
"hard" damages also included $175,000 in attorneys fees and $11,126 
in expenses and costs. Had the case of Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), been decided before the trial 
court awarded fees, the Crookstons would have also been entitled to 
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an additional $151,330 in attorneys fees based on the actual contin-
gent fee paid. In total, the out-of-pocket loss to the Crookstons, 
including attorneys fees and costs was $660,855. The "soft" damages 
amounted to $492,427. In this case the ratio of the "soft" to 
"hard" damages was less than one, i.e. $492,427 -5- $660,855 = .745. 
This ratio is approximately 5% of the ratio found overly generous in 
Cruz and 20% of the ratio which appeared satisfactory in Elkinaton. 
Although the jury awarded a significant amount of "soft" compensa-
tory damages, the award was appropriate in view of the equally 
significant amount of economic losses and harm inflicted on the 
Crookstons. 
C. The Nature of the Insurance Industry and its Marketing 
Practices Militate Against Reduction of the Punitive Award Based on 
the Hard/Soft Damages Distinction. 
When discussing the hard/soft damages in Crookston, the 
Court relied upon previous cases, none of which concerned the 
insurance industry. However, the unique nitch occupied by the 
industry distinguishes this case from historical precedent. 
It would be a significant irony for a court to remit a 
punitive award against an insurer because a substantial portion of 
the compensatory award consisted of "soft" damages. The industry 
advertises to obtain perspective buyers on the assumption that in 
time of emotional turmoil the insureds will have peace of mind. 
Because the industry presents itself as one whose faithful service 
prevents soft damages, an insurer, who has maliciously injured an 
insured should not benefit by reducing punitive damages just because 
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the malicious conduct created the emotional turmoil the insurer had 
promised to prevent. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY BALANCED THE 
FACTORS TO FURTHER SOCIETY'S GOALS OF 
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE. 
A. The Punitive Award Must be Proportionate to the Nature of the 
Acts as well as the Harm. 
This Court has held that punitive damages must be 
appropriate for the nature of the act and the harm done. See, 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975) and Elkinaton v. 
Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Here, Judge Frederick reason-
ably determined that Fire Insurance displayed a high degree of 
malice in defrauding the Crookstons and that the Crookstons suffered 
a significant degree of harm. Accordingly, the punitive award 
should reflect the aggravated nature of the conduct as well as the 
significant injuries inflicted. 
B. The Punitive Award Must Be Sufficient to Force Fire Insurance 
to Change Its Practices. 
The punitive award must be proportional to the risk posed 
by continued anti-social behavior. Fire Insurance has abundant 
opportunities and incentive to continue its unlawful activities. 
Judge Frederick, weighing these factors with Fire Insurance's 
calloused attitude toward claims processing, the lack of external 
constraints, and the potential harm to society, reasonably found the 
punitive award appropriate. 
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* Fire Insurance's Wealth Militates in Favor of the Award. 
Although four million dollars is significant, the award 
will not under any reasonable view of the evidence significantly 
impair Fire Insurance's ability to continue its business. Such an 
award, however, does have the desired effect of preventing Fire 
Insurance from absorbing the award as a mere cost of doing business. 
D. The Ratio of the Punitive Award to the Compensatory Damages 
Cannot Be Allowed to Subsume All Other Considerations. 
Of all the factors relevant to punitive dcimages, only one, 
the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages, could 
possibly favor a reduction of the punitive award. However, as Judge 
Frederick properly held, this sole factor should not subordinate 
consideration of all other factors. He concluded: 
If the facts of this case do not warrant 
deviation from the historically approved ratio 
of punitives to compensatory damages, it is 
difficult if not impossible for this Court to 
conceive of a fact situation wherein a 
deviation is warranted. 
R. 03218. 
IX. JUDGE FREDERICK DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO EMPANEL A JURY TO REASSESS PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES. 
Fire Insurance argues that even though this Court did not 
explicitly direct a retrial, the trial court should have granted a 
new jury on the basis that overruling precedent should be applied 
retroactively. Fire Insurance's argument is flawed in three 
respects. First, the jury was not standardless. Second, the only 
new standard is the trial court's consideration of a historical 
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ratio as it reviews the jury award. Third, the trial court had 
discretion in granting a new trial. 
A. The Jury's Discretion Was Not Standardless. 
Fire Insurance has selectively quoted from Crookston, 
inferring that the Court found a defect in the standards used in the 
jury instructions. Reference to the opinion, on the contrary, 
demonstrates that the Court unambiguously determined that Utah#s 
prior and current case law meets constitutional muster. 
In its first appeal, Fire Insurance argued that the puni-
tive damages violated due process. In disposing of this argument, 
the Court first noted that Fire Insurance had not properly raised 
the state constitutional claim. Crookston, at 800-801. Turning to 
the federal constitutional argument, the Court rejected defendant's 
claim, ruling that this Court's standards "are at least as stringent 
as, if not more stringent than" those affirmed in the United States 
Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haslip, U.S. 
, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). Ibid. 
In Pacific Mutual, the plaintiff brought an action against 
her health insurer claiming that the insurer had defrauded her in 
refusing to pay $4,000 in medical expenses. After finding fraud, 
the jury awarded $200,000 in compensatory and $840,000 in punitive 
damages. After reviewing the jury instruction on punitive damages1, 
both the Alabama and United States Supreme Courts affirmed the 
award, despite the insurer's constitution attack. 
See Exhibit C for full text of the instruction. 
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The punitive damage instructions in this case (see 
Exhibits D and E), were far more restrictive and enlightening than 
the instruction approved in Pacific Mutual. The Alabama court 
merely instructed the jury that punitive damages were not compensa-
tory and that the jury in fixing the amount was to consider the 
character of the wrong as well as the necessity of preventing 
similar wrongs. The instruction here carefully instructed the jury 
as to the nature of punitive damages — that they were to be given 
with caution and that in determining the amount the jury was to 
consider the seven factors. Because the jury here was far better 
instructed than the jury in Pacific Mutual, Fire Insurance errs in 
its claim of inadequate standards. 
B. The Standards Announced in Crookston Apply to The Trial Court's 
Consideration of the Motion for New Trial or Remittitur. 
This Court in Crookston reviewed its prior decisions and 
synthesized a guideline regarding the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages. Fire Insurance argues this ratio was a "new" 
standard which should be submitted to a jury. The text of the 
Crookston opinion demonstrates that the ratio test is a barometer 
for the trial court's use in reviewing punitive awards. Had this 
Court concluded that it was necessary for a new trial based on a 
"new" standard, the Court would have unambiguously ordered such a 
result, as it did in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 
98 (Utah 1985). 
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C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing to 
Submit the Punitive Damage Issue to a New Jury. 
Even though this Court did not mandate a new trial, Fire 
Insurance nonetheless argues that the trial court should have done 
so. However, even a cursory analysis demonstrates that the alleged 
benefits of doing so were far outweighed by the costs. 
In Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262 (Kan. 1974), a case upon 
which this Court previously relied in Loyal Order of Moose, No. 259 
v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982), the Kansas Supreme 
Court listed the factors that a court should consider in retro-
spective application of an overruling decision: 
Courts have given attention to various factors 
in determining whether or not they should apply 
an overruling decision retroactively. Some of 
the factors which have been considered are: 
(1) Justifiable reliance on the earlier law; 
(2) The nature and purpose of the overruling 
decision; (3) Res judicata; (4) Vested rights, 
if any, which may have accrued by reason of the 
earlier law; and (4) [sic] The effect retro-
active application may have on the administra-
tion of justice in the courts. 
Vaughn, 521 P.2d at 269. Three of the five factors have particular 
relevance here. 
1. Justifiable reliance on the earlier law. 
The jury instructions given in this action listed the same 
seven factors which have been repeatedly relied upon by the Utah 
courts in assessing punitive damages and were again reaffirmed by 
this Court in Crookston. 
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2. Nature and purpose of overruling decision. 
This Court did not direct the trial courts to submit the 
ratio test to the jury for use in its deliberations. Submitting the 
test to the jury would be ill advised, since the jury may very well 
distort the compensatory damage award in order to bring the punitive 
damage award within the ratio. See, American College of Trial 
Lawyers, Report on Punitive Damages of the Committee on Special 
Problems in the Administration of Justice, p. 15 (Mar. 3, 1989). 
Conversely, the jury might be unduly influenced by the ratio to 
increase its punitive award in cases where, because of mitigating 
circumstances, an award below the ratio would be appropriate. 
3. Effect on the administration of justice. 
The Crookstons' house collapsed nearly 11 years ago. This 
case has been outstanding for more than nine years and has already 
included one appeal. The emotional costs of the prolonged litiga-
tion continue to be problematic for the Crookstons. 
A new trial would also be a burden on the administration 
of justice. This Court has already upheld the finding of fraud and 
determined that punitive damages are in order. It would be unreal-
istic to believe, however, that a new trial on th€> amount of puni-
tive damages would be simple. The parties would be retrying the 
original case in order to give a new jury the full perspective of 
the defendant's actions. Obviously, the cost in time and effort for 
the court would burden an already crowded docket. 
The trial court reasonably concluded that the cost to the 
parties and the burden upon the trial court far outweighed any 
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speculative benefit to Fire Insurance. If appropriate, the trial 
court was empowered to reduce the award without a new trial. 
However, the judge determined the evidence was sufficient to support 
the amount of the original punitive award. 
X. CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S EXPLICIT HOLDING, FIRE 
INSURANCE IS INVITING THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE 
JURY'S FINDINGS DIRECTLY RATHER THAN REVIEWING 
THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON 
THE MOTION. 
This Court took great pains in Crookston to clarify the 
relative roles of the trial and appellate courts. Rather than 
reviewing the jury award directly, this Court's function is to 
determine whether the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying 
Fire Insurance's motion for new trial and remittitur. 
In his memorandum decision, Judge Frederick addressed each 
of the seven factors pertinent to the award of punitive damages and 
outlined his findings as to each element. In its brief, Fire 
Insurance addresses each of the seven elements but in most instances 
assiduously avoids discussing Judge Frederick's findings. Rather, 
Fire Insurance attempts to recharacterize the evidence in a light 
most favorable to its position and reaches conclusions directly 
opposite to those found by the trial court. 
The issue here is not whether there were other inferences 
the trial court could have drawn. Rather, the issue is whether 
Judge Frederick, after having viewed the witnesses and evaluated the 
evidence, had a reasonable basis for reaching the conclusions he 
did. Fire Insurance has failed to demonstrate that Judge 
Frederick's ruling had no reasonable basis. 
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XI. FIRE INSURANCE HAS NO BASIS TO ASSERT THAT 
IT WAS UNDULY PREJUDICED BY THE PRESENTATION 
OF ITS WEALTH TO THE JURY. 
Fire Insurance speculates that the introduction of evi-
dence as to its wealth may have affected the jury's determination of 
liability. This Court has already affirmed defendant's liability 
and it is inappropriate to raise the issue again. In any event, the 
evidence was abundant and clear that Fire Insurance committed fraud 
and other wrongful acts. Fire Insurance's wealth had nothing to do 
with the jury's finding of liability in this case. 
The introduction of Fire Insurance's wealth during trial 
was in full compliance with the law at that time. In fact, this 
Court had previously held that a verdict awarding punitive damages 
could not stand where the plaintiff had not introduced evidence of 
defendant's wealth. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1219 
(Utah 1983) . 
By failing to object, Fire Insurance has waived any claim 
that it was prejudiced by this evidence. R. 002516. Furthermore, 
Fire Insurance never requested a bifurcation of the issues of 
liability and punitive damages. 
XII. FIRE INSURANCE STILL DOES NOT APPARENTLY COMPREHEND 
THE NOXIOUS NATURE OF ITS WRONGDOING. 
Fire Insurance asserts that it has been punished enough by 
payment of $1.5 million in compensatory damages. Fire Insurance 
ignores the fact that $1 million of this payment was compensatory 
damages for injuries caused from 1982 to 1987 and paid in 1991 only 
after Fire Insurance was forced to pay as a result of the Crookston 
50 
opinion. The remainder of Fire Insurance's payment was interest—a 
payment exacted as a result of Fire Insurance's intransigence. 
The logic of Fire Insurance's argument demonstrates its 
absurdity. According to Fire Insurance, there should be an inverse 
relationship between the amount of compensatory and punitive 
damages. Under its theory, the defendant who acts most maliciously 
and inflicts the most severe injuries would have the least fear of 
ever paying punitive damages. 
XIII. NOTHING INDICATES THAT JUDGE FREDERICK WAS 
UNFAIRLY INFLUENCED BY EVIDENCE NOT IN THE 
RECORD. 
On pages 24-25 of its brief, Fire Insurance states that 
Crookstons represented to the trial court that after trial, plain-
tiffs remained homeless, were unable to obtain credit, and the 
creditors had not been paid. Crookstons provided this information 
to illustrate the continuing effect that Fire Insurance's misconduct 
had had on the lives of the Crookstons and others. The only refer-
ence to this information by the trial court was that Crookstons' 
parents were not paid until after this Court rendered its decision 
in June 1991. 
The trial court may draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence. At trial, plaintiffs, Anna Drake (trustee of the plain-
tiffs' bankruptcy estate) and other witnesses testified that 
plaintiffs' parents were creditors of the estate and that the only 
asset of the estate was the plaintiffs' claim against Fire 
Insurance. (R. 1842, 1859-64) Since Fire Insurance admittedly did 
not pay any of the compensatory damages until after the first 
51 
appeal, it was quite reasonable for Judge Frederick to conclude that 
the parents and other creditors were not paid during the interim. 
Regardless of the reasonable inference, Judge Frederick 
based his decision primarily upon the high degree of malice shown by 
Fire Insurance and the probability of the recurrence of the conduct. 
This reference to the injuries suffered by the Crookstons' parents 
hardly undermines the integrity of the trial court/s decision. 
Fire Insurance also asserts that plaintiffs' counsel, 
during oral argument, referred to other insurance companies in the 
Farmer's Insurance Group that use the same claims personnel as Fire 
Insurance. Counsel for Fire Insurance objected to any evidence 
relating to the wealth of these other companies. The trial court 
acknowledged the objection, stating: 
Well, it is accurate to state that there is no 
evidence before me regarding the wealth of the 
other members of the group; however, keeping in 
mind this is simply argument, this issue has 
been previously broached in the briefs which I 
have read, but your objection is well taken, 
Mr. Fishier. There is no evidence before me 
regarding that. 
R. 3273-3274. Although Fire Insurance characterizes these refer-
ences as an attempt to unduly prejudice and inflame the judge, Judge 
Frederick recognized that it was merely argument and that he was 
aware that this was not evidence. Nothing in the judge's decision 
refers to the wealth of the other companies in the Farmer's 
Insurance Group. In any event, it is not an unreasonable inference 
that the companies of the Farmers Insurance Group have monetary 
^alue, even if the extent of their wealth is unknown. 
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Finally, Fire Insurance takes exception to three portions 
of the order denying Fire Insurance's motion based on insufficient 
evidence. Fire Insurance first objects to the following language: 
The wrongdoing of this case was motivated by 
financial gain. When dealing with a multi-
million dollar corporation which appears to 
have a prevailing philosophy that justifies 
unscrupulous behavior for financial gain, a 
significant punitive award is required. 
The first sentence in this quote deals with a factual issue. The 
jury, the trial court, as well as this Court have affirmed that Fire 
Insurance perpetrated a fraud. It does not seem to be an unusual 
nor unreasonable inference for Judge Frederick to conclude that the 
fraud was perpetrated to bolster Fire Insurance's profits. The only 
other alternative is that the fraud was perpetrated solely out of 
spite or ill will, a conclusion which Fire Insurance has vehemently 
denied. 
Judge Frederick concluded that Fire Insurance has a 
prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous behavior. This is 
a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, including the 
testimony of the adjusters that their actions were conducted in 
accordance with Fire Insurance's prevailing philosophy and business 
practices. Moreover, the adjusters considered these practices to be 
sound business and performed in good faith. Judge Frederick was in 
the advantaged position of having heard and seen the arrogance and 
callousness of the adjusters that the cold record now hides. 
Judge Frederick noted that Fire Insurance, in responding 
to the insurance commission, denied any wrongdoing and ratified Mr. 
Clapperton's conduct. Thereafter, Fire Insurance twice promoted 
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Clapperton, placing him in charge of all claims adjusting in 
northern Utah, thus, apparently rewarding his conduct. Given this 
evidence, it was reasonable for Judge Frederick to conclude that a 
significant amount of punitive damages was required to change the 
company's practices. 
Fire Insurance additionally objects to the following 
language in the order: 
This court concludes that the most effective 
means of punishing and deterring the defendant 
in this case is through a significant punitive 
damage award. Insurance companies are general-
ly regulated by the Insurance Department of the 
State of Utah. This case illustrates the lack 
of deterrent effect of the insurance 
department. 
The first sentence is merely the court's conclusions based on all 
his findings. The second sentence is a statement of fact of which 
the trial court may take judicial notice. It would indeed be 
puzzling for Fire Insurance to contest this fact. The last sentence 
relates to the clear factual record that after the Crookstons lodged 
a formal complaint with the insurance department, Fire Insurance 
denied any liability. The insurance department, lacking the 
resources to pursue the matter, recommended that the Crookstons 
institute these proceedings. What better example can illustrate the 
department's lack of deterrent effect on Fire Insurance. 
Finally, Fire Insurance takes exception to the following 
language: 
Defendant, by the very nature of its business, 
has the capacity and expertise to calculate in 
advance its exposure to liability and spread 
the cost thereof, thus diminishing the deter-
rent effect of punitive damages if limited by 
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ratio or ceiling. In this case the relative 
importance of the presumptive ratio should 
therefore be less. 
While admittedly there probably is no actual evidence as to the 
calculation of exposure to liability, Judge Frederick in reaching 
his conclusions was certainly not required to surrender his life's 
experiences and common knowledge. It is hardly disputed that the 
insurance industry employs actuaries and underwriters to assess risk 
and set premiums accordingly. The very essence of insurance is 
spreading a risk of loss through widespread premiums. Given the 
industry's expertise, it is certainly not unreasonable for the court 
to reach this conclusion. 
XIV. FIRE INSURANCE'S ARGUMENTS BESPEAK A LACK OF 
ETHICAL AND MORAL JUDGMENT APPARENTLY TYPICAL 
OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE. 
Although Fire Insurance now "acknowledges" that the jury 
and this Court found that it perpetrated an intentional fraud, it 
nonetheless argues vociferously there was no relationship of trust 
or reliance created by the insurance contract because of the 
adversary relationship between it and the Crookstons. Fire 
Insurance does not appear to grasp the important distinction between 
an adversary relationship and intentional fraud. This Court has 
previously set the standard for acceptable business ethics as 
follows: 
It can hardly be maintained that the general 
moral level of business and other financial 
relationships would be enhanced by a rule of 
law which would allow a person to defend 
against a willful, deliberate fraud by stating, 
"You should not have trusted or believed me" or 
"Had you not been so gullible you would not 
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have been [so] deceived." The rules governing 
fraud should foster intercourse based on trust, 
forthrightness, and honesty. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Berkley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 
1980). Fire Insurance's attitude seems to be endemic to the 
insurance industry and underscores the need of significant punitive 
awards to bring the practices of all insurance companies into line 
with acceptable business practices. 
Given the significant profits to be gained by unscrupulous 
conduct, one commentator has emphasized the need for a significant 
deterrent: 
Another consideration that has not been 
expressly articulated by the courts but which 
seems to logically flow from the purposes of 
punitive damages is the opportunity that defen-
dant and others may have to repeat the wrongful 
conduct and the likelihood that defendant would 
repeat that conduct unless adequately deterred 
by an award of punitive damages. It seems 
obvious that if the defendant is in a position 
to repeat its conduct and has an incentive to 
do so because, for example, of the profitabil-
ity of that conduct, the need for a substantial 
punitive damage award to deter such conduct is 
greater than if the conduct is not particularly 
profitable to the defendant or involved unusual 
circumstances that are not likely to arise 
again. 
This factor may have special relevance to the 
area of insurance bad faith. A large insurer 
that underwrites thousands of policies with the 
potential for a significant number of claims 
has both the opportunity and the financial 
incentive to engage in unreasonable claims 
practices. Unless checked by an adequate award 
of punitive damages, the insurer might well 
regard its potential compensatory damage expo-
sure as an acceptable "risk" of doing business 
and therefore continue to engage in such 
conduct. 
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Shernoff, Gage & Levine, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation, Matthew 
Bender 1991, Section 8.08[5], pp. 8.36-8.37. The quest for money is 
the motivation for illegal activity. A monetary penalty is thus the 
only means of changing the motivation. 
One commentator has observed a very interesting phenomenon 
regarding reform in the insurance industry. Professor Harvey 
Levine, reviewing numerous articles and speeches advocating reform 
in claims practices, observed: 
Those authors and speakers do not condemn the 
practices of the past, nor do they consider the 
need for formulating a foundation of social 
conscience in the future. Instead, each of the 
authors and speakers, without exception, has 
merely focused upon the need to improve claims 
practices so as to avoid punitive damages 
verdicts. The suggested reforms do not grow 
out of condemnations of unscrupulous treatment 
of insureds; thev are mere defensive efforts to 
avoid punitive damages verdicts. Absent the 
development of the tort theory of recovery and 
the incidental punitive damages verdicts, it is 
doubtful that the claims practices of the 
insureds would be any less unconscionable than 
they were prior to the imposition of substan-
tial exemplary damages liability. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Levine, "Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of 
Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions," University of San 
Francisco Law Review, Vol. 13, p. 626. 
Fire Insurance has never admitted or acknowledged 
culpability nor has it ever expressed remorse for its reprehensible 
conduct. Discussions about moral imperatives and ethical conduct 
will not change Fire Insurance's attitude. The only language that 
Fire Insurance understands is the language of money. By its 
punitive award, the jury sent a message to Fire Insurance in the 
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language that it understands best. Hopefully, Fire Insurance and 
similarly situated companies will ultimately hear the message and 
act to curb their unlawful practices. By contrast, a reduction in 
the award sends a much weaker and perhaps a contradictory message. 
An unscrupulous insurance company should never be lead to believe 
that, given the appropriate opportunities, it may profit from 
wrongdoing in the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court does not sit to retry the facts or second guess 
the jury. Rather, its duty is to review Judge Frederick's ruling on 
Fire Insurance's motion to determine if Judge Frederick abused his 
discretion in refusing to disturb the jury's verdict. Judge 
Frederick was present at the trial and is best positioned to deter-
mine whether the jury award was a product of passion and prejudice. 
Judge Frederick, after hearing the evidence first hand and evaluat-
ing the parties' extensive arguments concerning the evidence, 
balanced the relevant factors and determined that the punitive award 
was appropriate. His conclusions were reasonable and abundantly 
supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Crookstons respectfully 
request this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of Fire 
Insurance's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and award them their 
costs on appeal. 
DATED this / / ^ day of September, 1992. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN £x^WELL/>£. C. 
M. Douglas Ba 
Attorneys for Plaintiff&^Respondents 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CR-83-1030 
Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange (hereinafter "Fire 
Insurance") has filed a Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, 
with supporting Memoranda; plaintiffs have responded by filing 
a Memorandum in opposition. These pleadings were filed after 
failed efforts to settle the controversy conducted by this 
Court on October 7, 1991. 
This matter was tried with a jury for six days, commencing 
on the 26th day of May, 1987. After denial of defendant Fire 
Insurance's initial Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, the 
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (June 28, 1991), affirmed the 
jury verdict, but remanded the matter for further determination 
by this Court as to whether or not the punitive damage award 
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was appropriate and/or excessive. After submission of 
respective Memoranda, counsel presented oral argument in 
support of their respective positions on January 31, 1992. 
This Court having now reviewed the Memoranda, the Supreme Court 
decision, the file materials, the transcript, its own notes of 
the trial, and heard oral argument, is prepared to rule. 
OPINION 
At trial, plaintiffs7 expert economist, Dr. Paul Randall, 
testified incident to the claim of economic damages sustained 
by the plaintiffs as a result of conduct alleged to have been 
inappropriate by the defendant Fire Insurance. He testified 
that those economic losses amounted to $323,399.00. The jury 
awarded the sum of $815,826.00 total compensatory damages. The 
Supreme Court has opined that the difference between the 
economic losses and the total amount of compensatory damages 
awarded, namely, $492,427.00 was "apparently attributable to 
emotional distress and loss of financial reputation." In 
addition, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of 
$4,000,000.00. This Court, subsequent to trial awarded 
$175,000.00 attorney's fees to plaintiffs, as well as their 
costs incurred of $11,126.00. Fire Insurance seeks, pursuant 
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to Rule 59(a)(5), a remittitur of the punitive damages of 
$4,000,000.00, or alternatively a new trial. 
A Motion for a New Trial as presented, on the issue of 
punitive damages requires of the trial court a two-prong 
inquiry: (1) whether punitives are appropriate at all; and (2) 
whether the amount of punitives is excessive, appearing to have 
been given under influence of passion or prejudice. The 
responsibility of the trial court is to review the amount of 
the award to insure that the jury has acted within proper 
bounds. This is so because the trial judge is present during 
all aspects of the trial and listens to and views all witnesses 
and is in an advantaged position to determine if the jury acted 
with passion or prejudice. To grant a new trial, the trial 
court must conclude that the jury erred, not merely because it 
disagrees with the jury's judgment. The trial court, if it is 
inclined to grant a new trial or remittitur, should indicate 
wherein there was plain disregard of the instructions of the 
Court or the evidence, or what constituted passion or prejudice. 
If the trial court reasonably concludes the jury acted with 
passion or prejudice contrary to Rule 59(a)(5) it may grant a 
new trial. 
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The award of compensatory damages in the amount of 
$323,339.00 for economic loss, and $492,427.00 for emotional 
and mental distress, and loss of financial reputation, for a 
total of $815,826.00, was upheld by the Supreme Court, as was 
the award of attorney's fees of $175,000.00, and expenses of 
$11,126.00. These sums this Court is advised were paid after 
the decision by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In this case, the jury clearly concluded as did this Court, 
that the requisite mental state required to support an award of 
punitive damages was present, which finding was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Punitive damages are designed to punish past and deter 
future, egregious conduct. Here, the award of $4,000,000.00 
according to the Supreme Court exceeds the bounds of the 
general pattern set by prior Supreme Court decisions. In 
deciding, therefore, whether the award is or is not excessive, 
notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds the pattern of awards 
previously upheld, seven factors are to be considered. These 
are the same seven factors considered by the jury (in 
Instruction No. 33) in arriving at its verdict. This Court 
will address each, in a somewhat different order, commencing 
with the facts and circumstances surrounding Fire Insurance's 
misconduct. 
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I. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING FIRE 
INSURANCES MISCONDUCT 
The most flagrant conduct of Fire Insurance centered around 
intentional fraud of its agents. By April 15, 1982, Fire 
Insurance, for the loss plaintiffs# sustained in December of 
1981, had obtained bids from two contractors: one for 
$50,951.00; the other for $49,600.00; and had extended 
authority to settle the claim for $49,443.00. In May, 1982, 
the adjuster obtained another bid for $74,000.00. Immediately 
thereafter, Fire Insurance replaced its initial adjuster, 
Denton Mosier, with one "more experienced," Alan Clapperton. 
Alan Clapperton, while in possession of the three bids ranging 
from $49,600.00 to $74,000.00, and armed with authority to 
settle for $49,443.00, nevertheless, sought and obtained a 
fictitious bid based only on a portion of the loss, for 
$27,830.60, which was just slightly more than one-half of the 
other bids received. The evidence was undisputed that the bid 
did not account for several items comprising the plaintiffs' 
loss, and was based upon an engineering report which was not 
intended to be the basis of a bid. Clapperton knew the bid was 
insufficient; he knew the Crookstons would object to the bid; 
and moreover, he knew that the bank (loss payee) with whom he 
had arranged to meet to negotiate settlement, would not settle 
for such amount if the other bids were disclosed. 
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In order to accomplish his scheme, Clapperton simply told 
Ralph Klemm, counsel for the plaintiffs, on the very day he was 
scheduled to meet with the bank, that he had no authority to 
settle; concealed the existence of the fictitious bid; and 
without disclosing his intent to Klemm, surreptitiously 
conducted his negotiations with the bank. While meeting with 
the bank, Clapperton did not disclose the fact that three other 
bids, all substantially higher, had been obtained, nor did he 
reveal that the fictitious bid of $27,830.60 was based on an 
engineer's appraisal limited to structural damage only. The 
bank officer agreed to settle for slightly more than 
$32,000.00, the amount of the "bid", plus an approximation of 
the interest that had accrued on the Crookston loan since the 
collapse. Knowing full well that the $27,830.60 bid was 
substantially lower than any other bid, Clapperton insisted 
that the bank accept a settlement check made out only to the 
bank, not jointly to the bank and the Crookstons, and that the 
bank execute a proof of loss form releasing Fire Insurance from 
any further liability on the claim. The settlement was 
effected that same day. The intentional fraud was completed 
when Clapperton advised Klemm, when he discovered what had 
transpired, that the Crookstons did not have to be included in 
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the settlement, that nothing more was owing, and that he was 
closing his file. 
Clapperton admitted at trial that he knew that the bank 
would pursue the Crookstons for a deficiency claim on the 
$60,000.00 construction loan not paid by the insurance 
settlement. Clapperton purposely sought an incomplete and 
unrealistic bid from an insider, Phipps; concealed the bid from 
the Crookstons, lied to their attorney about the status of the 
claim on the very day he negotiated with the bank; did not 
disclose that he had any settlement authority; and deliberately 
excluded the Crookstons from negotiations with the bank. 
Because the Crookstons lacked the means to pay off the loan, 
the bank threatened foreclosure. In order to avoid additional 
interest, attorney's fees and costs, the Crookstons deeded the 
property on which the home stood, to the bank in lieu of 
foreclosure, and then filed bankruptcy. 
Clapperton left the Crookstons vulnerable to foreclosure 
and bankruptcy knowing that would be the likely consequence of 
his actions. 
Clapperton's supervisor, Kent Soderquist, had previous 
experience as a loan officer for a bank and was aware of the 
bank's foreclosure rights under its Deed of Trust. Both 
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Soderquist and Clapperton were well aware that if insurance 
proceeds were not timely and adequately paid, the bank would 
foreclose. Furthermore, Fire Insurance through its agents had 
actual knowledge that the bank was proceeding or intended to 
proceed to foreclose on Crookstons' property. The most graphic 
evidence of Fire Insurance's intent evidencing total 
indifference to the Crookstons' plight, can be seen from the 
language of the letter, a trial exhibit, from Clapperton to 
Frank Roybal, counsel for Fire Insurance, dated July 27, 1982, 
at page 3, wherein Clapperton states as follows: 
The bank has indicated that they intended to 
proceed with foreclosure on the lot in order 
to recoup the $18,000.00 they were still out 
on the construction loan.... At this point, 
we feel Farmers Insurance Group would have ci 
subrogation right against several of the 
parties involved. 
All of Fire Insurance's representatives acknowledged at 
trial that the purpose of insurance was to prevent extreme 
financial hardship and loss of property that would otherwise 
occur, but for insurance. Fire Insurance ratified and approved 
all of the actions taken by its agents. The regional office of 
Fire Insurance and the district branch claims manager reviewed 
the claims file routinely during all relevant times, and had 
made various communications to the adjusters. 
After the Crookstons filed a complaint with the Utah State 
Insurance Department, the regional office denied any 
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responsibility to the Crookstons. Incredibly the agents of 
Fire Insurance testified at trial that the practices which had 
been employed in this case were sound business practices. 
Three of Fire Insurance's employees who testified at trial 
stated that they believed they had treated the Crookstons 
fairly. The claims adjuster who committed the fraud, 
Clapperton, stated without any indication of remorse or regret, 
that he "felt good" about what he did to the Crookstons. 
Apparently, based upon his record of improving profits for Fire 
Insurance, he was twice promoted since his dealings with the 
Crookstons. He is now the District Claims Manager supervising 
the adjustment of all claims in northern Utah. 
II. THE RELATIVE WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT 
At trial, evidence established that Fire insurance's total 
assets in 1986, the year immediately prior to the date of the 
trial, were $723,468,116.00; its total underwriting, investment 
and other income for 1986 was $595,284,582.00; and its net 
income for that one year was $23,000,000.00. At the time of 
the trial, the evidence disclosed that there were four claims 
offices in Utah, each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year. 
In addition, scores of other offices located in the western 
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United States handle a similar number of claims. Fire 
Insurance is only one of approximately five insurance companies 
doing business as Farmers Insurance Group. Four of the five 
Farmers companies use the same claims offices, management, and 
presumably the same claims adjustment techniques as that of 
Fire insurance. When compared to the total assets of Fire 
Insurance only, for 1986, the punitive damage award amounts to 
approximately one-half of one percent. It goes without saying 
that there is no rational comparison between Fire Insurance's 
assets and income to that of plaintiffs: they were bankrupt. 
III. NATURE OF THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT 
Milton Beck, an insurance adjuster with 22 years of 
experience, and Dr. Paul Randall, a professor of finance, who 
teaches property and casualty insurance at Utah State 
University, persuasively described the actions of Fire 
Insurance as "blatantly outrageous" and "totally unacceptable", 
outlining the following wrongful actions: 
(a) Excluding the Crookstons from settlement negotiations; 
(b) Relying on a bid which was almost one-half of other 
bids. Such a discrepancy would mean there was something 
wrong with the low bid; 
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(c) Failing to disclose all other bids to the bank; 
(d) Improperly requiring the bank to sign a satisfaction 
of claim and release without rebuilding the home; 
(e) Requiring the bank to sign a release and refusing to 
deal with the Crookstons thereafter, leaving the Crookstons 
personally exposed to further proceedings by the bank; 
(f) Representing that the Phipps bid ($27,830.60) was 
adequate, and all that was owing under the policy, when 
there were clearly other coverages and amounts owing 
thereunder; 
(g) Refusing to include the insureds7 name on a settlement 
check in payment of a substantial amount of money; 
(h) Representing that engineer Rich's report (on which the 
Phipps "bid" was obtained) was a complete analysis of the 
damage when it was not; 
(i) Using the Crookstons7 failure to sign a proof of loss 
form as grounds for denying their claims, particularly when 
the Crookstons were not provided with such a form, and 
adequate evidence of the loss had been provided to Fire 
Insurance; 
(j) Rejecting the bids of Brewster, Stallings and Jones 
(the three legitimate bids) because of insufficient detail, 
without requesting the additional information and detail; 
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(k) Failing to disclose to the Crookstons that Fire 
Insurance was rejecting the other bids and the reasons 
therefore; 
(1) Not communicating with the Crookstons during the 
entire adjusting process; 
(m) Refusing to consider additional claims of the 
Crookstons after settling with the bank, denying 
responsibility to the insurance commissioner when a 
complaint was filed by the Crookstons, and forcing the 
Crookstons to bring legal action; 
(n) Refusing to clean up the collapse, even after the city 
had given notice and threatened to condemn the property due 
to the hazardous situation; 
(o) Delaying over six months while the Crookston home was 
unfit for occupation, before making any attempts to settle; 
(p) Maintaining a company policy that the only duty of an 
adjuster is to protect the financial interests of the 
insurance company and not the insured. 
The evidence supporting Fire Insurance's position with 
regard to the adjustment of the Crookstons' claim and Fire 
Insurance's apparent satisfaction with the manner in which its 
C-52C7 
CROOKSTON V, FIRE INSURANCE PAGE 13 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
own insureds were treated represents both to this Court and 
apparently to the jury, that ill-will, malice and/or total 
indifference to the Crookstons was its attitude. Having sought 
an inadequate bid, and having excluded the Crookstons from the 
negotiations, Fire Insurance was in total control of the 
settlement with the bank. Knowing that the settlement would 
have a devastating impact on the Crookstons, Clapperton 
nevertheless proceeded in a fraudulent, malicious fashion with 
one goal in mind: to cheat the plaintiffs out of their just 
due and thereby presumably improve his standing with his 
employer. By their actions, the agents and representatives of 
Fire Insurance demonstrated either actual malice and ill-will 
toward the Crookstons and intended the consequence of their 
actions, or Fire Insurance's agents acted wrongfully, solely to 
further their own financial well-being, despite actual 
knowledge of devastating harm to the Crookstons. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S MISCONDUCT ON THE LIVES 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND OTHERS 
The plaintiffs each testified at trial to the devastating 
effect the actions of Fire Insurance had on their personal 
G^ros 
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lives. They suffered serious emotional and nervous conditions, 
which were of long-standing nature, and the devastation 
testified to continued from the date of the Loss, at least 
through the trial (approximately six years). In addition, the 
plaintiffs were forced to file bankruptcy and lost, as a 
result, all of their savings and the lot they had purchased 
upon which to build their "dream home." 
The loss to others involved the parents of the plaintiffs 
who had loaned them some $12,000.00 for the construction of 
their home. They were not paid until after the Supreme Court 
decision in this matter, in June 1991, some ten years after the 
loss. In addition, none of the Crookston bankruptcy creditors 
were paid. The bank, after settling with Fire Insurance and 
being required to foreclose and repossess the Crookstons/ 
property, nevertheless sustained a loss of approximately 
$5,000.00. Subcontractors who provided materials and labor to 
the Crookstons' home were forced to file liens and commence a 
suit against the Crookstons. The general contractor was never 
fully paid, and Fire Insurance failed to timely clean up the 
debris from the collapse of the home, forcing the city where 
the home was located to seek condemnation of the Crookstons' 
property because of the hazardous condition it created for 
neighborhood children. 
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V, THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE RECURRENCE OF THE MISCONDUCT 
Fire Insurance has maintained a stance of denial of 
wrongdoing since the beginning of this case. All of the 
witnesses for Fire Insurance testified they believed they had 
treated the Crookstons fairly. Clapperton, moreover, testified 
that he felt good about what he did to the Crookstons. 
Clapperton has been twice promoted since the incident in 
question, and as indicated he is now District Claims Manager 
for Northern Utah. 
Denton Mosier, since his involvement in the matter, has 
been made supervisor and testified that the handling of the 
Crookstons7 claim was done according to company policy, was 
appropriate, and was handled in a fashion similar to the 
handling of other claims. 
Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor at the time of the 
loss, described the claims adjusting philosophy of not just 
Fire Insurance, but for all Farmers Insurance Group to indicate 
that the adjuster's sole responsibility is his duty to the 
insurance company: to protect the insurance company's 
interests. And any efforts to assist the insureds in proving 
their loss would be "beyond the scope of his actual duties as 
an adjuster." He testified the adjuster does not have a duty 
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to protect the interests of the insureds, and technically the 
adjuster is not required to be concerned about public 
relations. 
In addition, the evidence revealed that there are 
approximately four claims offices of Fire Insurance in Utah, 
each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year, and scores of 
other such claims offices throughout the states which handle a 
similar number of claims. These claims offices adjust most, if 
not all, claims of all members of the Farmers Insurance Group. 
It is the view of this Court, that Fire Insurance's conduct 
and lack of remorse incident thereto demonstrate a calculated 
and calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and 
this is in accord with what agents of Fire Insurance perceive 
to be in keeping with their company policy. 
From Fire Insurance's point of view, it certainly can be 
argued that $4,000,000.00 punitive damages is excessive. 
However, from a public policy point of view, the award is 
justified. In the absence of punitive damages, Fire Insurance 
may well find that it is profitable to continue its illegal 
conduct, even though it may incur the cost of compensatory 
damages from time to time. One may never know how many of the 
thousands of claims handled in Utah and elsewhere by Fire 
H *> r>'\ -f 
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Insurance have been subjected to the same kind of fraudulent 
manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses 
to those who contracted in good faith. A $4,000,000.00 
punitive damage award can certainly have a salubrious effect in 
inducing Fire Insurance to bring its practices into harmony 
with common moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say 
nothing of the requirements of the law. 
VI. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES 
The loss payee provision in favor of the bank on the 
insurance policy with Fire Insurance created a relationship 
between the Crookstons and Fire Insurance of one in the nature 
of a fiduciary relationship. In a third party insurance 
situation, the insurer is a fiduciary of the insured. The 
insurer assumes responsibility for the insured and control over 
the claims of third parties against the insured. By contrast, 
in first party situations, the insurer and the insured are 
essentially adversaries, because their interests concerning 
payment under the policy are opposed. 
The instant matter is somewhere between a first and third 
party situation. The insurer by its loss payee responsibility 
assumed the position of standing in for and protecting the 
CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE PAGE 18 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
interests of the Crookstons from claims of the bank, the loss 
payee. If Fire Insurance did not have a legal duty to protect 
the interests of the Crookstons, it at least had the 
responsibility to avoid doing harm to the Crookstons by 
surreptitiously settling with the bank for sums admittedly much 
less than the balance owing on the bank obligation; the policy 
limits; and well below the amount of the legitimate bids known 
to the defendant. 
VII. THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES AWARDED 
The actual attorney's fees paid by the Crookstons were 
based upon a contingency fee of 40%. This Court, however, only 
awarded $175,000.00 in fees, which was a little more than half 
of the actual fees paid by the Crookstons. The fees and 
litigation expenses constituted an actual loss to the 
Crookstons. In determining the ratio, the Supreme Court used 
the words "actual damages." Since the attorney's fees and 
litigation expenses were an "actual" damage sustained by the 
Crookstons and were awarded by the Court, such figures should 
be included in determining the ratio. This is consistent with 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), 
wherein the Supreme Court held that the actual contingent fee 
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was a consequential damage and should be awarded against the 
insurer who acted in bad faith, stating at 420: 
Canyon Country's claim for recovery of fees 
was predicated on the theory that attorney 
fees were an item of consequential damages 
flowing from the insurers' breach of 
contract. This is a legitimate theory of 
damages, as the trial court recognized. 
Had Canyon Country been decided before the Crookston trial, 
this Court would have awarded a 40% contingent fee instead of 
$175,000.00 in "reasonable" fees actually awarded. The deficit 
of $151,330.00 as unawarded fees, constitutes additional 
"actual" loss to the Crookstons. 
The amount of actual damages incurred amounts to 
$1,153,282.00 ($815,826.00 compensatory, $175,000.00 and 
$151,330.00 attorney's fees, and $11,126.00 expenses and 
costs). When compared to the punitive damage sum awarded of 
$4,000,000.00, the ratio is ^proximately 2.88 to 1. There is 
nothing in the Crookston opinion that would suggest that the 
presumptive ratio is based on "hard" damages, rather than all 
"actual" damages. In fact, in the cases cited in Crookston 
where "soft" damages were awarded, the ratio cited by the court 
includes the "soft" damages. The Supreme Court suggests that 
if a substantial portion of the damages are "soft", the trial 
O321A 
CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE PAGE 20 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
court may consider that fact on a motion for remittitur. 
However, it is not a factor to determine the ratio. The Utah 
Supreme Court has never suggested that "soft" damages are not 
real or should not be compensated. 
Though the amount of so-called "soft" damages comprises 
approximately 60% of the total compensatory damage award, 
those damages were nevertheless real, and represented suffering 
and loss sustained by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' emotional 
distress was severe and of longstanding duration. The jury was 
instructed as to what properly constitutes emotional distress, 
pain and suffering. The Supreme Court has affirmed that 
determination by the jury as being well within their 
discretion. This Court's view is that the jury's finding was 
appropriate and supported by the evidence. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in the case of Price v. 
Peterson. 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), at 1329: 
The pain and suffering inflicted on the mind 
and the emotions by such wrongful act of 
another is no less real; and should be no 
less entitled to be compensated for. 
The problem is not that emotional harm should not be 
compensated, but how to insure that the damages awarded are 
commensurate with the emotional harm. In addressing the 
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problem, courts often consider whether there is physical harm 
associated with the mental harm. Courts also examine the 
conduct of the defendant to determine whether emotional harm 
will naturally and reasonably follow therefrom. Professor 
Prosser, in discussing this issue, stated: 
[W]here physical harm is lacking, the courts 
will properly tend to look for more in the 
way of extreme outrage as an assurance that 
the mental disturbance claimed is not 
fictitious; but that if the enormity of the 
outrage itself carries conviction that there 
has in fact been severe and serious 
emotional distress which is neither feigned, 
nor trivial, bodily harm is not required. 
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal.Rev. 40 
(1956). 
The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and outrageous. 
There is nothing fictitious or trivial about the Crookstons' 
bankruptcy and loss of their home and property. Given the 
egregious conduct and succeeding events, there is no doubt that 
the Crookstons' claims for mental distress are real, unfeigned, 
and far from trivial and therefore should be viewed as real 
damage. 
T;:e amount of punitive damages awarded must bear some 
reasonable relationship to the actual compensatory damages 
incurred as the jury was instructed in Instruction No. 34. 
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Despite the fact that the ratio here involved is higher than 
has been generally approved by the Supreme Court in the past, 
here the defendant is a multi-million dollar corporation. 
Moreover, it is this Court's view that Fire Insurance has 
displayed an extremely high degree of malice, with actual 
intent to harm for the benefit of its own financial interests, 
or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great harm 
to the plaintiffs based upon the reprehensible nature of the 
acts involved. 
The calculation of the ratio is simply one of seven 
separate elements and to be given, in this Court's view, no 
greater or lesser weight than any of the other six elements. 
One must not simply, mechanically apply an arbitrary ratio, 
thereby allowing the ratio factor to subsume all of the other 
six factors to be considered. It is necessary and appropriate 
to send a clear and unmistakable message to Fire Insurance and 
others similarly situated that the type of egregious conduct 
involved which results in the devastating loss, both financial 
and emotional as here involved, will not be tolerated. This, 
the jury has done. There was no evidence at all at trial that 
the practices and procedures involved have in any manner been 
changed by Fire Insurance. There was no indication of 
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contrition or remorse and, in fact, it appeared that Fire 
Insurance was pleased with the outcome of the adjustment of the 
loss, and to this day has failed or refused to recognize the 
wrong that it has wrought upon the plaintiffs. If the facts 
of this case do not warrant deviation from the historically 
approved ratio of punitives to compensatory damages, it is 
difficult if not impossible for this Court to conceive of a 
fact situation wherein a deviation is warranted. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those delineated in 
the Memorandum of the plaintiffs in opposition to defendant's 
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, this Court is not persuaded 
the jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, and 
the Motion of Fire Insurance is denied. Counsel for plaintiffs 
is directed to prepare the appropriate Order. 
Dated this ay of February, 1992. 
JNNI^TFRE'DERI CK 
["RIOJCJCOURT JUDGE 
t-r?2i8 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L. ] 
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE, ; 
Trustee of the Estate of ) 
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and ] 
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a ] 
California corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT, 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> AND ORDER DENYING 
I DEFENDANT'S MOTION ] 
> NEW TRIAL OR IN THE 
) ALTERNATIVE REMITTO 
> Civil No. C83-1030 
l Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for New "Prial or in the Alternative 
Remittitur came regularly before the court on the 31st day of January, 1992, at the hour of 8:30 
a.m. The parties previously filed memoranda in support and in opposition to the motion. This 
court reviewed the memoranda, the Supreme Court opinion, the file materials, the transcript, 
its own notes of the trial and considered extensive oral argument by counsel. Th© court 
thereafter took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on February 
10, 1992, wherein the court articulated its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its 
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decision to deny defendant's motion. Said Memorandum Decision is fully incorporated herein 
by reference. 
This court reaffirms its denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial and Remittitur and 
reaffirms its conclusion that the punitive damage award should not be reduced. In so doing, the 
court expresses the following conclusions in conjunction with its more detailed analysis of its 
findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision. 
1. The primary purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter serious wrongdoing 
which is destructive to the social fiber of our society. The severity of the punishment should 
coincide with the severity of the wrongdoing. Likewise, the greater the potential is that the 
wrongdoing is widespread and profitable, the greater the need is for deterrence. 
2. Regarding the purpose of punishment, the court has carefully analyzed the nature and 
extent of defendant's wrongdoing and the effect thereof. It is this court's view that Fire 
Insurance has displayed an extremely high degree of malice, with actual intent to harm for the 
benefit of its own financial interests, or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great 
harm to the plaintiffs. Defendant's actions were reprehensible and involved intentional fraud 
for financial gain. Defendant's wrongdoing had devastating effects upon the Crookstons and to 
a lesser degree, many other innocent parties. Defendant's wrongdoing was particularly 
aggravating and reprehensible due to the nature of its business, i.e. marketing, advertising and 
selling "peace of mind" and "hope" to those who had been devastated by catastrophic events. 
When an insurer is called upon to perform, its insureds are often victims of tragic events, 
leaving them financially and emotionally vulnerable. The potential adverse effect on the lives 
2 
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of family members, neighbors, employers and others is also great. Under these circumstances, 
intentional fraud for profit is even more culpable. The severity of defendant's actions in this 
case requires a severe punishment and the punitive damage award of $4,000,000 is not overly 
severe. 
3. The second purpose of punitive damages, deterrence, is equally applicable in this 
case. Defendant's conduct and lack of remorse incident thereto, not just at the time of the 
wrongful conduct but even thereafter throughout the litigation, demonstrate a calculated and 
calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and this was in accord with what agents of 
defendant perceived to be in keeping with their company policy. The wrongdoing in this case 
was motivated by financial gain. When dealing with a multi-million dollar corporation which 
appears to have a prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous behavior for financial gain, 
a significant punitive damage award is required to obtain the desired result of bringing 
defendant's practices into harmony with common moral conduct, accepted business ethics and 
the requirements of the law. 
4. This court concludes that the most effective means of punishing and deterring the 
defendant in this case is through a significant punitive damage award. Insurance companies are 
generally regulated by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah. This case illustrates the 
lack of deterrent effect of the Insurance Department. After Crookstons filed a complaint with 
the Insurance Department, defendant's regional office denied any responsibility to the 
Crookstons. The Insurance Department then advised the Crookstons that it could do* nothing 
further and that Crookstons would need to seek a judicial remedy. As in this case, there is 
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nearly always a large disparity between the financial resources of an insurer and its insured, 
particularly after a catastrophic loss. The deterrent value of punitive damages is one of the very 
few equalizing tools an injured party has against a multimillion dollar corporation which engages 
in such wrongful practices. 
5. The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages in this case exceeds the 
presumptive ratio set by the Utah Supreme Court in the Crookston opinion. (On page 19 of the 
Memorandum Decision this court erred in computing the ratio in this case. The ratio should be 
3.47 to 1 instead of 2.88 to 1 and the Memorandum Decision is therefore amended accordingly.) 
For the reasons set forth above, a ratio greater than the presumptive ratio is justified. 
Defendant, by the very nature of its business, has the capacity and expertise to calculate in 
advance its exposure to liability and spread the cost thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect 
of punitive damages if limited by a ratio or ceiling. In this case the relative importance of the 
presumptive ratio should therefore be less. 
6. The collective analysis of the seven factors upon which a punitive damage award is 
based weighs heavily in favor of sustaining the $4,000,000 award. In fact, with the exception 
of the presumptive ratio, all of the seven faciors support the award. If the facts of this case do 
not warrant deviation from the historically approved ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, 
it is difficult if not impossible for this court to conceive of a fact situation wherein a deviation 
is warranted. 
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Remittitur is denied. 
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DATED this ^ a a V o f 
Approved as to Form: 
STRONG & HANNI 
March, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
By: 
Philip R. Fishier 
Stephen J. Trayner 
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Philip R. Fishier 
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and mailed first class mail thisl^^day of March, 1992 to: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition 
to compensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the 
word discretion, I say you don't have to even find fraud, you wouldn't 
have to, but you may, the law says you may award an amount of money 
known as punitive damages. 
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is 
not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the 
defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary 
damages, which means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel, 
but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the 
plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has had a fraud 
perpetrated upon them and as a direct result they were injured and in 
addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion award 
punitive damages. 
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages 
is to allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plain-
tiff, by way of punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose 
of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others 
from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages 
is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to 
award it unless this jury feels that you should do so. 
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you 
must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong 
as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3>3 
In addition to the compensatory damages, the Crookstons 
also seek an award of punitive damages against Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded against Fire 
Insurance Exchange, you must find the issues in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the insurance company and further, you 
must find from a preponderance of the evidence that the insurance 
company's employees' conduct was willful and malicious, or such 
conduct was done with a knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, the Crookstons1 rights. If you so find, you 
may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as in your 
judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to Fire 
Insurance Exchange for such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to 
others not to offend in like manner. If such punitive damages 
are given, you should award them with caution and you should keep 
in mind they are only for the purpose just mentioned and not the 
measure of compensatory damages. 
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you 
should consider each of the following factors: 
1. the relative wealth of the defendant; 
2. the nature of the defendant's misconduct; 
3. the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's misconduct; 
4. the effect of defendant's misconduct on the lives 
of the plaintiffs and others; 
5. the probability of future recurrence of the mis-
conduct ; 
6. the relationship between the parties; and 
7. the amount of compensatory damages awarded. 
Punitive damages should be more than an inconvenience to the 
defendant and their amount should be sufficient to discourage the 
defendant and other companies similarly situated from doing or 
repeating such misconduct in the future. 
Exhibit E 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that punitive damages constitute an 
extraordinary remedy outside the field of usual redress remedies 
which should be applied with caution lest, engendered by passion 
or prejudice because of a wrongdoing, the award becomes 
unrealistic or unreasonable. 
The law provides no fixed standard as to the amount of 
punitive damagesf but leaves the amount to the jury's sound 
discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice, however, the 
law requires that any award for such damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the actual damages. 
